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BREAKING BIVENS?: FALSIFICATION CLAIMS
AFTER ZIGLAR V. ABBASI AND REFRAMING THE
MODERN BIVENS DOCTRINE
Alex Langsam*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi purported to
clarify the role of the judiciary in inferring Bivens suits directly from the
Constitution, rather than a federal statute. Despite this effort, uncertainty
has plagued the lower courts. While the Court’s recent Bivens jurisprudence
has focused on issues concerning national security, uncertainty also persists
in Bivens claims in other domains. This Note examines Bivens claims
seeking damages for constitutional violations by law enforcement agents who
falsify evidence, lie to procure a search warrant, and commit other similar
acts of misconduct. After recognizing a broad, unacknowledged circuit split
on such claims, this Note offers a framework that would resolve the
inconsistences that now abound while conforming to the principles of both
Ziglar v. Abbasi and the original Bivens case.
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INTRODUCTION
A federal officer falsifies documents and manipulates witnesses, leading
to two years of detention for a wrongfully charged defendant.1 An FBI agent
1. See Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2019).
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fabricates evidence to justify seizing an American citizen.2 U.S. marshals
plant a bullet in a man’s apartment after arresting him while in search of
someone else.3 A DEA agent misrepresents critical information in a search
warrant affidavit.4 Though law enforcement’s conduct in each instance
seems an egregious violation of the Constitution, only some of the victims in
these examples have been allowed their day in court to seek damages under
a Bivens claim. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ziglar v.
Abbasi,5 some lower courts have taken a remarkably restrictive turn, while
others have not.
As any first-year law student knows from Marbury v. Madison, a
fundamental principle of our legal system is that “where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy.”6 When it comes to the rights protected by the
Constitution itself, the expectation that such a concept would hold true is
especially intuitive. Yet the validity of this foundational principle has been
called into question in some of these tragic cases, due to lower courts’
attempts to apply the Supreme Court’s current position on the availability of
Bivens7 remedies.
Abbasi, decided nearly three years ago, represents the culmination of a line
of cases limiting the availability of Bivens claims.8 Bivens claims were first
recognized in their modern form by the Supreme Court in 1971 to permit
monetary damages for certain constitutional wrongs inflicted by federal
government officials.9 Although Congress had never statutorily authorized
this kind of suit against federal officials, as it had for their state and local
counterparts in the aftermath of the Civil War,10 the Court held it could imply
a damages suit to vindicate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.11 The
Abbasi Court, however, declared that the creation of new kinds of Bivens
claims should now be considered a “‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”12
Accordingly, the Court tightened an already strict framework for lower
courts to determine if they could extend a new Bivens action: first, determine
if the suit presents a “new Bivens context”;13 if so, decide whether there are
“special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
2. See Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019).
3. See Jacobs v. Alam, 915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019).
4. See Boudette v. Sanders, No. 18-CV-02420-CMA-MEH, 2019 WL 3935168 (D. Colo.
Aug. 19, 2019).
5. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*23).
7. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
8. See infra Part I.D.
9. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
11. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. For additional background on the original Bivens
decision, see James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith
Resnik eds., 2010).
12. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
13. Id. at 1859.
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Congress.”14 For claims that allege constitutional violations in the
investigative or prosecutorial process after arrest, answering yes to both of
these questions requires immediate dismissal of the suit.15
Significant attention has followed the Supreme Court’s most recent Bivens
case,16 which examined a foreign national’s ability to bring a damages suit
after being shot and killed on the foreign side of the border by a federal
official on the U.S. side.17 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits reached opposite
conclusions in nearly identical circumstances, prompting the Court to address
the issue.18
Beyond the cross-border claims that have drawn the most attention,
however, lower courts have been just as inconsistent in applying Abbasi to
another significant domain of Bivens claims,19 which this Note terms
“falsification claims.”20 These cases involve plaintiffs who assert that
federal actors have engaged in a variety of unconstitutional acts including:
fabrication of evidence, deliberate misrepresentation by law enforcement
officers in judicial proceedings, malicious prosecution, and coercion.21
These falsification claims surface in circumstances far more common than
the cross-border claims in Hernández v. Mesa,22 yet are subject to a similar
degree of uncertainty across the country.23 If anything, the lower federal
courts’ varied and often-conflicting analyses of these kinds of Bivens claims
suggest a greater need for clarity; unlike the typical circuit split, there are
more than two ways to treat these suits with respect to Abbasi.24
Additionally, falsification claims present other concerns unique to the
Bivens doctrine. Though plaintiffs in these cases will always seek damages
from a law enforcement official, as in the original Bivens case, each
falsification claim invariably presents different circumstances and interests

14. Id. at 1857 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
15. Id. at 1859–60.
16. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Will the Supreme Court Stand Up for an
Unarmed Mexican Teenager Shot by a Border Agent?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/opinion/supreme-court-mexico-border-patrol.html
[https://perma.cc/MAP9-7EBE].
17. See Hernández v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct.
2636 (2019).
18. Compare Hernández, 885 F.3d at 823 (dismissing a Bivens claim), with Rodriguez v.
Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018) (allowing a Bivens claim).
19. See infra Part II.
20. For purposes of simplicity and brevity, this Note classifies the relevant Bivens suits as
“falsification claims.”
This covers fabrication of evidence; false testimony;
misrepresentations relating to search warrants, arrests, and grand jury testimony; coercion of
witness testimony; malicious prosecution; and any other claim examined in this Note.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Sarah Macaraeg, Fatal Encounters: 97 Deaths Point to Pattern of Border Agent
Violence Across America, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/may/02/fatal-encounters-97-deaths-point-to-pattern-of-border-agent-violenceacross-america [https://perma.cc/JAJ6-BZHL] (reporting approximately six deaths per year
over a fifteen-year period).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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than the quintessential search-and-seizure case.25 Moreover, there is a
unique tension in this sphere of litigation where, on the one hand, Congress
clearly intends redress for some of these claims26 but, on the other, the Court
has instructed that an alternative remedial structure might, on its own, prevent
a Bivens suit.27 Finally, the misconduct alleged in falsification claims, in
addition to harming the specific plaintiff, harms the integrity of the entire
judicial process. Therefore, the Abbasi Court’s question of whether the
judiciary is “well suited” to decide if a damages action should proceed is
particularly relevant to these kinds of Bivens suits.28
This Note illuminates this lack of clarity, analyzes the inflection points,
and resolves the conflicts embedded within the landscape of these
falsification Bivens claims. Part I examines the history of Bivens claims
generally, touching on the rich tradition of damages suits against government
officials, before focusing on the progression from the foundational 1971 case
to Abbasi in 2017. In this forty-six-year period, the policies and rationales
the Court has sought to protect have evolved dramatically—so much so that
the current Court views the original Bivens decision as part of an “ancien
regime.”29 Whereas the Bivens Court focused on the judiciary’s prerogative
to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Constitution,30 the current Court has
emphasized separation-of-powers concerns when the Court, rather than
The Court’s evolving
Congress, authorizes a cause of action.31
jurisprudence, accompanied by little congressional guidance in the interim,
has set the stage for a wide range of case law surrounding falsification claims
in the lower courts.32
Part II reviews these falsification claims in the post-Abbasi landscape and
assesses their viability across the federal circuits. This Part catalogs the
results of these suits for unconstitutional conduct outside the traditional
search-and-seizure context, with allegations like fabrication of evidence,
false testimony, malicious prosecution, and coerced confessions. Ultimately,
the survey finds that, since Abbasi, courts often reach very different
conclusions about the viability of these Bivens claims. Some courts have
embraced Abbasi to permit such claims, others to deny them, while a third
group has refrained from applying Abbasi directly.
Having introduced the current landscape of these Bivens actions in Part II,
Part III dissects them in terms of the specific analytical framework offered
by Abbasi. This Part looks past the results of the cases to compare and
contrast the three major guideposts for a post-Abbasi Bivens analysis. First,
25. Compare infra Part I.B (Bivens), with infra Part II (post-Abbasi falsification claims).
26. For a discussion on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), see infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
27. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1855 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)). The Court
also noted that the results of the first three Bivens cases “might have been different if they
were decided today.” Id. at 1856.
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. See infra Part I.D.
32. See infra Part II.
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it examines the antecedent question of whether the case presents a “new
Bivens context.”33 Second, the relevant case law is discussed in terms of
“special factors counselling hesitation.”34 Third, this Part turns to an analysis
of how courts address these claims in light of a potential “alternative remedial
structure.”35 Distilling these falsification claims to their core components,
Part III draws out the distinctions that lie at the heart of the conflict in postAbbasi claims of this nature.
Part IV addresses these conflicts and offers a new way of understanding
Abbasi to resolve them. Although inconsistent interpretations of Abbasi at
the lower courts might warrant abandoning Abbasi altogether,36 this Part
proposes a solution that conforms with its central reasoning, thereby rejecting
a drastic overhaul of the doctrine. To that end, this Note offers narrower and
more concrete guideposts to help the lower courts answer the following three
essential questions: (1) whether the falsification claim constitutes a new
Bivens context; (2) whether special factors counselling hesitation exist; and
(3) whether there is an alternative remedial structure that bars the claim.
Most importantly for each, Part IV establishes that Abbasi’s focus on
separation of powers is best understood as prohibiting the judiciary from
second-guessing the policy judgments of the political branches. This insight,
familiar in other spheres of litigation concerning law enforcement
misconduct,37 would help transform what is often a nebulous and variable
concept into a workable roadmap for deciding these cases. Finally, Part IV
ends by asserting that the unique characteristics of falsification claims can
help answer whether the courts are “well suited” to decide whether a Bivens
remedy is warranted.38 Finally, this Note concludes with a brief Addendum
to address the Court’s recent decision in Hernández v. Mesa,39 its latest foray
into Bivens. Though Hernández concerns very different circumstances than
the falsification claims examined in this Note, it nevertheless confirms the
centrality of Abbasi for lower court guidance in future Bivens claims.
Hernández thus supports this Note’s analysis of the modern Bivens doctrine
generally and of falsification claims specifically.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN BIVENS DOCTRINE
The creation of the judicially inferred Bivens action in 1971 was, to some
extent, the beginning of a new era for the Court in this kind of litigation.40
33. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859.
34. Id. at 1857.
35. Id. at 1858.
36. See generally infra Parts II–III.
37. For example, see damages suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60
Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) and 42 U.S. § 1983
(2012). For additional examples, refer to infra note 77 and accompanying text and infra note
64 and accompanying text.
38. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
39. No. 17-1678 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2020).
40. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1854 (framing the background of the 1971 Bivens decision). The
Court pointed to the one-hundred-year period in which Congress had not created an analogous
federal statute to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Id.
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Still, the notion that federal courts had the ability to fashion a damages
remedy for personal wrongdoing by government actors was not exactly
new.41 The Abbasi decision, forty-six years after Bivens, solidified the
Court’s significant departure from the original doctrine, even if it was not
entirely surprising in light of the Court’s recent treatment of Bivens suits.42
Part I frames these two seminal cases within their relevant legal backgrounds,
starting with the Marshall Court, continuing to the Burger Court and the
“retrenchment of Bivens,”43 and finally to the current Court.
A. Judicially Implied Damages Suits Pre-Bivens
The American legal tradition has long permitted personal damages suits
by private citizens against federal government officers.44 In the early
republic, the primary means of government accountability consisted of
common-law suits against officials who had personally wronged
individuals.45 An example of such a case is Wise v. Withers,46 in which the
Supreme Court permitted an award of damages against a justice of the peace
after he unlawfully entered the plaintiff’s home to collect a fine.47 In a
similar case, the Court had little difficulty deciding that a customs official
would be personally liable for the overcollection of taxes that occurred during
the course of his ordinary duties.48 Nearly fifty years later, the Court found
that a federal marshal’s execution of a writ of attachment on the wrong person
and the subsequent taking of his property warranted personal damages.49
Even though Congress never explicitly authorized these suits, the Court
assumed a cause of action would arise if the citizen was wronged.50 Rather
than resting on any statutory authorization, these cases proceeded on their
common-law basis and ultimately served a pivotal function: they provided
redress for the plaintiffs and also “allowed individuals to test the legality of
government conduct.”51 Given the broad doctrine of sovereign immunity in
the early republic, these suits were essential to the judiciary’s ability to define
the legality of government action and restrain its excesses.52

41. See infra Part I.A.
42. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 933, 948–52 (2019) (discussing the Court’s “mounting resistance” to Bivens
claims).
43. Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1123, 1141 (2014).
44. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall
Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 531 (2013).
45. See JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 6 (2017).
46. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806).
47. Id. at 336–37.
48. See Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 158 (1836).
49. Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U.S. 17, 19 (1884).
50. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1862, 1871 (2010).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1876.
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Though these actions typically proceeded as common-law torts, rather than
as discrete constitutional violations, they nonetheless often vindicated the
same interests.53 For example, though the justice of the peace in Wise was
liable for trespass,54 a common-law tort, damages for unlawful entry by a
government official into a private citizen’s house also vindicated the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.55 As in Wise, the constitutional right
would often become central to these cases since an officer operating within
the scope of his duties could not escape liability under any circumstances if
his actions were in violation of the Constitution.56
B. The Bivens Suit: A “Remedy to Make Good the Wrong Done”
When Webster Bivens sued six federal narcotics agents for an alleged
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, both the district court and the
Second Circuit agreed that his suit should be dismissed.57 Bivens alleged
that the agents, lacking probable cause, had broken into his house without a
search warrant, arrested him in front of his family, threatened to arrest his
family, and then mistreated him at the police station.58 Still, the Second
Circuit held, in accordance with all other circuits that had recently examined
the question,59 that the Fourth Amendment itself, without additional statutory
authority, did not authorize a private damages action.60
The Second Circuit’s reference to statutory authority requires a brief note
on § 1983 suits.61 The damages provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
(better known as § 1983 pursuant to its codification) authorized damages
suits for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws” at the hands of state government officials under
the color of state law.62 In 1961, the Court held in Monroe v. Pape63 that a
city police officer was subject to suit under § 1983 for an unreasonable search

53. See Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 44, at 537.
54. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 335 (1806).
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A court’s pronouncement that a federal official was liable
for trespass would also serve to prevent an unreasonable search. See Pfander & Hunt, supra
note 50, at 1871 (discussing common law writs as checks on the government).
56. See Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 44, at 532–33; see also Fallon, supra note 42, at
936 (noting that the defense of official authorization fails if the conduct violates the
Constitution).
57. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971).
58. See Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301), 1970 WL 136798, at
*2–3; Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 295 (1995) (providing more details of the arrest).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Fanseca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964) (dismissing the
damages suit); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1957) (same).
60. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718,
720 (2d Cir. 1969), rev’d, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
61. For more discussion of the Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence, see Sina Kian, The Path of
the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court
Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 182–90 (2012).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
63. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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and seizure.64 An officer’s conduct could thus be covered by the parameters
of § 1983 even if “wholly unauthorized by state law”;65 that is, if it were
rogue action.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit’s decision in 1971.66 The Court held that, though the Fourth
Amendment itself did not expressly provide a money damages remedy,
federal courts nevertheless could “use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done.”67 The Court framed the issue as whether damages, a
remedy “normally available” through the federal courts, should be available
in the present context.68 The principle that the judiciary has the power to
remedy legal wrongs, especially those violative of the Constitution, thus
guided the Court’s reasoning.69 Flowing from that premise, damages were
merely one of the tools at the Court’s disposal to redress those wrongs and
hardly unusual in the context of historical remedies for “invasion[s] of
personal interests in liberty.”70 In doing so, the Court also eliminated the
anomaly whereby plaintiffs could only seek redress if a state officer—but not
a federal officer—had violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Next, in words that would frame the legal debate for the next four decades,
the Court further justified its holding by noting that there were “no special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.”71 Justice William Brennan’s opinion distanced the case at hand
from a previous matter of “federal fiscal policy,” which would be one such
special factor.72 There, the Court opted not to infer damages since the
plaintiff was the United States itself; the party seeking relief could thus
legislate any liability it wished the courts to infer.73 But even more
importantly, in contrast to other cases in which the Court denied a damages
remedy, Bivens was ultimately about a plaintiff seeking to vindicate his
constitutional rights.74
The dissenters launched a three-pronged attack against the majority’s
decision. Chief Justice Warren Burger emphasized that the Court’s creation
of a remedy improperly intruded into the legislative sphere.75 Justice Hugo
Black added that Congress had authorized § 1983 suits for constitutional
violations by state officials and thus could readily do the same for federal

64. Id. at 187.
65. See Kian, supra note 61, at 182.
66. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
398 (1971).
67. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
68. Id. at 397.
69. See id. at 395–96.
70. Id. (listing examples).
71. Id. at 396.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 396–97 (examining Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) and United States
v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954)).
75. See id. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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officials.76 Along those lines, he viewed the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as a model for how Congress could “take the lead” on this front.77
Lastly, Justice Harry Blackmun wrote to endorse the Second Circuit’s
reasoning.78 He agreed that the Framers likely did not intend a cause of
action to arise directly from the Fourth Amendment, and, further, the
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings was the more natural remedy for
violations of the Fourth Amendment.79 All three expressed additional
concerns about the potential “avalanche of new federal cases” that might flow
from this new cause of action.80
Nevertheless, Bivens established that plaintiffs could proceed with
damages suits against federal officers who had violated their Fourth
Amendment rights. The majority was ultimately persuaded that the risk that
the Fourth Amendment might become a “mere ‘form of words’” was more
troubling than any concerns about the judiciary stepping on Congress’s
toes.81
C. The Road from Bivens to Abbasi
In the decade following Bivens, the Court extended the availability of
damages to claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. In Davis v.
Passman,82 the Court allowed a due process claim under the Fifth
Amendment to proceed.83 That claim alleged a violation of equal protection
when a congressman fired a staffer based on gender.84 Turning to the Eighth
Amendment a year later, the Court affirmed the availability of a Bivens suit
after a federal prisoner died due to officials’ deliberate indifference to his
known medical needs, which constituted cruel and unusual punishment.85 In
76. See id. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 421 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for the
federal government for torts committed by its employees acting within the scope of their
employment. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2018). However, that waiver is
subject to certain exceptions, perhaps most prominently, the discretionary function exception.
Id. § 2680(a). Accordingly, the government is not liable if the conduct passes a two-pronged
test: (1) the conduct involves “an element of judgment or choice” and (2) “that judgment is
of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). Pertinent to Part IV of this Note, the discretionary
function exception is “meant to discourage courts from using the occasion of private litigation
to second-guess legislative and executive branch policy decisions.” JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG &
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 179 (2010). Additionally, the government is not normally
liable for its employees’ intentional torts, save a select few, if committed by law enforcement
agents. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (commonly known as the “law enforcement proviso”). Nor can
the government be held liable for constitutional torts under the FTCA. FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 478 (1994).
78. Bivens, 403 U.S at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (focusing on injunctive relief and the exclusionary rule).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 402 F.2d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1969)).
82. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
83. Id. at 230.
84. Id.
85. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
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Carlson v. Green,86 the Court also clarified that Bivens claims and FTCA
suits were “parallel, complementary causes of action”;87 the possibility of an
FTCA suit did not preclude a Bivens suit.88 Though both suits would offer
the victim an avenue for redress, beneath this lay an important difference:
Bivens suits are also meant to deter unconstitutional conduct, which can be
accomplished more readily if individuals, rather than the government, are
held liable.89 Thus Davis and Carlson supplemented the Bivens landscape
by adding to the roster of constitutional wrongs susceptible to damages and
also by explicitly stating the deterrence rationale that supports all Bivens
actions.
At the time, it appeared that courts might extend the availability of Bivens
to all constitutional violations, becoming a perfect federal analogue to § 1983
suits.90 But Carlson was the last time the Supreme Court expressly endorsed
an extension of Bivens.91 In the nine cases at the Supreme Court between
1980 and 2017, the Court removed certain constitutional rights from the
scope of Bivens in some92 and further developed the prohibitive “special
factors” in others.93
By the time Abbasi was heard in 2017, the Court had shaped an approach
to determine the viability of a Bivens suit. First, courts should ask whether
an alternative process existed that might be reason not to provide a new
damages remedy.94 Assuming there was no convincing reason on the
alternative remedy front, a court must still do the work typical of a “commonlaw tribunal” and determine if special factors warranted refusal to extend the
cause of action.95

86. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
87. Id. at 20.
88. Id. at 19. The Court noted that Congress’s 1974 amendment to the FTCA, which
permitted FTCA suits for certain international torts by law enforcement officers, made it
“crystal clear” that FTCA suits and Bivens suits were counterparts. Id. at 20. Any potential
ambiguity was clarified by the legislative history. Id. at 19–20; see S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3
(1973) (noting that the law enforcement proviso “should be viewed as a counterpart to the
Bivens case and its progenty [sic]”).
89. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20–21.
90. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 821–22 (2010)
(discussing the extension of Bivens remedies in the circuit courts to violations of the First,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
91. See Kent, supra note 43, at 1141 n.80 (listing the nine Bivens cases at the Supreme
Court between Carlson and Abbasi that expressly addressed the Bivens question, all of which
refused to allow any further extension).
92. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (rejecting a Bivens claim for
retaliation); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens suit for a First Amendment
violation).
93. See, e.g., Hui v. Castenada, 559 U.S. 799 (2010) (precluding Bivens claims against
Public Health Service employees following the passage of specific legislation); Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (precluding a Bivens claim for a due process violation due to a
complex administrative remedy process for Social Security benefits); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296 (1983) (noting that the military context was a special factor).
94. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.
95. Id.
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In sum, the Court gradually but steadily narrowed the availability of Bivens
after Carlson, taking a multifaceted approach to stem the flow of Bivens
claims. At times it opted to cut off entire categories of constitutional
violations,96 while at others, it chose to add to the roster of special factors
that should counsel hesitation.97 Still, even as late as 2012, the Court’s
guidance allowed for a certain amount of latitude; courts were instructed to
understand their role as “a common-law tribunal” when deciding whether to
recognize a Bivens remedy.98
D. Abbasi: Bivens as a “Disfavored Judicial Activity”
Against this backdrop, Abbasi followed along the path the Court had
embarked on since it had last extended a Bivens remedy in Carlson. Yet the
context for Abbasi was quite different than much of the Court’s prior Bivens
jurisprudence. In the years following 9/11, government efforts to combat
terrorism included conduct that has since been questioned for its
constitutionality.99 These practices spurred a new class of Bivens suits by
those allegedly mistreated by the national security apparatus.100 Compared
to the relatively straightforward search and seizure of Webster Bivens,101 the
national security elements of Abbasi had the potential to implicate novel and
complex issues, including the constitutional rights of foreign nationals,
extraterritorial rights in American and allied facilities abroad, and the
consequences such suits might have on well-debated policy choices by the
political branches.102 In Abbasi, at least some of these difficult questions
came to the forefront.
The Abbasi litigation arose from sweeping arrests of over 700 Middle
Eastern undocumented immigrants by the FBI in the aftermath of 9/11.103
Once detained, many were subjected to extremely harsh treatment, including
physical abuse, frequent strip searches, deprivation of basic hygiene, inability
to contact lawyers or others outside the detention facility, and twenty-three

96. See, e.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 380 (First Amendment claims).
97. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (finding that the “potentially
enormous financial burden” to an agency was a special factor).
98. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 122–23 (2012) (quoting Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550).
99. See PFANDER, supra note 45, at 31, 42–43 (discussing detention in Guantanamo Bay,
enhanced interrogation, extraordinary rendition, and prosecuting terrorism as war crimes).
100. See Peter S. Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for Bivens
Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1153, 1166–67 (2018). In one case,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint by establishing a heightened
pleading standard, requiring “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
For more on Iqbal, see PFANDER, supra note 45, at 42–44.
101. See supra Part I.B.
102. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861–62 (2017). For further elaboration on the
implications of these Bivens claims, see Andrew Kent, Thoughts on the Briefing to Date in
Hernandez v. Mesa—the Cross-Border Shooting, LAWFARE (Dec. 27, 2016, 1:59 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-briefing-date-hernandez-v-mesa%E2%80%94-crossborder-shooting-case [https://perma.cc/G6ML-BXZZ].
103. See Margulies, supra note 100, at 1166.
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hour confinement in small cells.104 The plaintiffs, six detainees, challenged
those conditions and whether there had been any factual predicate for the
FBI’s suspicion of their ties to terrorism, which was the alleged basis for their
monthslong detention.105 Their Bivens suit sought damages from two groups
of officials, which the Court classified as “Executive Officials”106 and
“Wardens.”107 Essentially, the plaintiffs made “detention policy claims”
against the Executive Officials, alleging that they were subjected to
unconstitutional treatment while detained, which was imposed on account of
their race, religion, or national origin.108 Additionally, they claimed the
abuse they suffered due to the Wardens’ conscious indifference also violated
their Fifth Amendment rights.109 While the district court originally
dismissed the claims against the Executive Officials, the Second Circuit
reinstated them.110 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to define “the
reach and the limits” of their Bivens claims.111
In the decision’s exposition of the history of Bivens and its progeny, the
Court extolled the Bivens doctrine for its power to “vindicate the
Constitution” and to oversee and guide federal law enforcement officers with
respect to permissible conduct.112 However, to the Abbasi Court, the central
question was whether Congress or the courts should be authorizing damages
suits in light of separation-of-powers principles.113 For the majority,
authorizing damages suits was a task better suited for Congress.114
Yet the Court also recognized that a drastic change might present stare
decisis problems, given how frequently the claims arise in the law
enforcement sphere.115 As a result, the Court decided that courts should only
question suits that arise in a “new Bivens context.”116 If it is not a new
context, the suit should proceed; but if the court found the case presented a
new context, it must then determine if there were “special factors” that might
compel the court to reject extending a damages remedy.117 Ultimately, the
Court viewed this new context inquiry and special factors analysis as a twopronged framework to focus lower courts’ attention on the separation-ofpowers issue it deemed central to the Bivens question.118
104. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1852.
105. Id. at 1853.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1853–54, 1858. Holding the plaintiffs under punitive pretrial conditions would
be a due process violation; intentional disparate treatment on account of race, religion, or
national origin would violate equal protection. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
109. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853.
110. Id. at 1854.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1856–57.
113. Id. at 1857.
114. Id. at 1860. Abbasi was a 4-2 decision from which Justices Gorsuch, Kagan, and
Sotomayor recused themselves. Id. at 1843.
115. Id. at 1857.
116. Id. at 1859.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1857–60.
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Having set the stage, Justice Anthony Kennedy began his application of
the Court’s new standards by finding the claim presented a new Bivens
context.119 Most importantly, it was meaningfully different from the Court’s
three previous endorsements of Bivens claims.120 Justice Kennedy defined
the suit as an action challenging detention conditions that were enacted as the
result of high-level policy decisions following a major terrorist attack.121 As
such, none of the three Bivens claims the Court had previously approved
could support the suit.122
Turning to the special factors analysis, Justice Kennedy affirmed that
Bivens was not meant to alter the policy of an executive agency; it served to
deter an individual official’s personal conduct.123 When the policy decisions
of high-level officers are susceptible to suit, it might inhibit discussion and
deliberations or distract officials from their national security duties.124 As it
pertained to the Executive Officials, the alleged conduct was inextricably
linked to policy decisions about national security, namely the creation of a
strategy to find those involved in the 9/11 attacks and to prevent related future
attacks.125 To the Court, this was not the kind of conduct Bivens was meant
to vindicate, nor could it plausibly deter.126 This policy-focused analysis thus
constituted the first special factor warranting dismissal.
The Court also touched on three other special factors that justified its
rejection of the claim against the Executive Officials. First, the plaintiffs
were not challenging “standard ‘law enforcement operations’” but, rather,
national security activity.127 Second, in the sixteen years since 9/11,
Congress had been silent about creating a damages remedy for this kind of
claim despite its “frequent and intense” interest in terrorist detention.128
Finally, the Court pointed out the plaintiffs had an alternative available
remedy in the form of a habeas petition, which would have provided
injunctive relief.129
Ultimately, Abbasi represented the Court’s attempt to solidify the cautious
approach it had developed since Carlson and to focus on separation of
powers. Framing the question in terms of a “new Bivens context” and
“special factors,” the Court appeared to emphasize that it disfavored
119. Id. at 1860.
120. Id. at 1859. The Court offered a nonexhaustive list of potential differences that might
make a case meaningfully different, including “the rank of the officers involved; the
constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action.” Id. at 1860.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.” (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 485 (1994))).
124. Id. at 1860–61.
125. Id. at 1861–62.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1861 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990)).
The Court added that “[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and
President.” Id.
128. Id. at 1860 (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988)).
129. Id. at 1863. For more on the element of injunctive relief in Abbasi, refer to Jules
Lobel, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Demise of Accountability, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2149 (2018).
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extending Bivens claims while also acknowledging that Bivens remained
important for enforcing certain constitutional guarantees and, in some
respects, had developed into a settled body of law. Though it did not upend
the Court’s Bivens jurisprudence given its decisions after Carlson, it
nonetheless appeared to present a much higher bar for Bivens claims to clear,
regardless of the alleged conduct at issue.
II. AFTER ABBASI: THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF FALSIFICATION CLAIMS IN
THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Scholars predicted that Abbasi would be the death knell for Bivens claims
that did not mirror the fact patterns of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.130 Much
of the scholarly focus has been in the realm of national security, which
Abbasi and other cases131 had addressed directly.132 But the Abbasi decision
is obviously not limited to this context; it applies just as much to day-to-day
law enforcement as to matters of terrorism and national security. In fact, as
this Part of the Note explains, Abbasi has proven especially difficult to apply
to claims concerning investigative and prosecutorial misconduct. Part II of
this Note focuses on Bivens claims alleging misconduct in the realm of
fabrication of evidence, false testimony to a grand jury, malicious
prosecution, and the like, as they diverge across eight different circuits postAbbasi. This Part illuminates an unacknowledged circuit split about these
kinds of claims. Specifically, Part II.A examines those circuits that have
interpreted Abbasi to prohibit these falsification claims. Part II.B presents
the circuits that understand Abbasi to permit them. Finally, Part II.C turns to
circuits in which the post-Abbasi status of falsification claims is unsettled.
A. Falsification Claims Prohibited: The Eighth Circuit in Farah and the
Fifth Circuit in Cantú
To some circuit courts, Abbasi provided direct guidance that falsification
claims should now be dismissed on their face. This section presents two such
cases from the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, each of which addressed
these claims of law enforcement misconduct under the two-pronged Abbasi
framework and determined that extending a Bivens claim to this falsification
context was not warranted.

130. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Ziglar v. Abbasi and the Decline of the Right to
Redress, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2167 (2018).
131. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009)).
132. See generally PFANDER, supra note 45; Andrew Kent, Bivens in National Security
Cases, Before and After Ziglar v. Abbasi, in JUDGING NATIONAL SECURITY (Robert M.
Chesney & Stephen I. Vladeck, eds. forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3417977
[https://perma.cc/8H87-9EEV]; Kent, supra note 43; Margulies, supra note 100 (discussing
Bivens in the national security context).
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1. Farah v. Weyker
The Eighth Circuit recently relied on Abbasi to decide whether to permit a
Bivens claim alleging that a federally deputized police officer lied,
manipulated witnesses, hid exonerating evidence, and falsified other
evidence.133 In 2008, federal investigators in Tennessee joined a Minnesota
sex-trafficking investigation after an alleged victim of the suspected ring
turned up in Nashville.134 As the investigation developed, prosecutors
charged nine individuals with various crimes flowing from a multistate
conspiracy.135 Some defendants were acquitted by a jury,136 while others
had their convictions vacated by the judge’s directed verdict.137 When the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to set aside the guilty
verdict, it raised the possibility that the entire alleged criminal enterprise
might be fictitious.138
Following acquittal, the defendants sued Officer Weyker, the federally
deputized leader of the investigation for the local Minnesota police
department.139 They alleged she had invented facts in her reports, deceived
prosecutors and the grand jury, and manipulated witnesses to lie, which led
to the defendants’ detentions for periods ranging from four months to three
years in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.140 The district court
permitted a Bivens suit to proceed, but the Eighth Circuit reversed.141
The Eighth Circuit understood the claim at hand to be a new context for a
variety of reasons.142 Comparing Farah’s case primarily to the original
Bivens case, the court viewed “case-building activities,” such as witness
interviews and drafting reports, to be different from the apprehension-related
conduct in Bivens, even if both claims were grounded in the Fourth
Amendment.143 The court also saw a meaningful difference in the nature of
the injury: Officer Weyker’s misconduct required intervening steps by thirdparty actors such as prosecutors or grand jurors to reach Farah; Webster
Bivens suffered directly at the hands of the agents.144 Finally, the court
determined that fact-finding in Farah’s case would require a level of intrusion
into the executive branch that had not existed in Bivens’s case.145
133. See Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 2019).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office Middle Dist. of Tenn., Verdicts Returned in Somali
Sex Trafficking Case (May 3, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/tnm/
pressReleases/2012/5-4-12.html [https://perma.cc/MQ76-Q8YH].
137. See United States v. Fahra, 643 F. App’x 480, 489, 494 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding
insufficient evidence for charges to reach the jury).
138. See id. at 484 (noting the court’s “acute concern, based on our painstaking review of
the record, that this story of sex trafficking and prostitution may be fictitious”).
139. Farah, 926 F.3d at 496–97.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 503–04.
142. Id. at 498–99.
143. Id. at 499.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 501.
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Turning to the second prong of the Abbasi framework, the panel focused
on Abbasi’s proclamation that interference and intrusion into the executive
branch could be special factors.146 Building on its new context analysis, the
court’s refusal to allow a Bivens suit relied in large part on the rationale that,
to succeed, the plaintiffs would need to show that Weyker’s misconduct
precipitated probable cause for their arrests and subsequent detentions.147
This, in turn, would lead to a trial reconstructing the prosecutorial process.148
The ensuing review of the inner workings of a federal prosecution constituted
precisely the kind of executive branch intrusion that Abbasi cautioned
against.149
The Eighth Circuit also viewed Congress’s previous efforts to address
these kinds of injuries as an additional special factor.150 The Hyde
Amendment151 permitted courts to award attorney’s fees to criminal
defendants prosecuted in bad faith and, additionally, unjust conviction
statutes offered damages remedies.152 The court recognized this offered little
to acquitted defendants represented by appointed counsel (like the plaintiffs).
Nevertheless, it held that congressional involvement in this realm—but no
damages remedy—suggested an intentional omission rather than an
oversight.153
2. Cantú v. Moody
In the post-Abbasi landscape, the Fifth Circuit has also rejected the
viability of a falsification claim. In Cantú v. Moody,154 the Fifth Circuit
examined a Bivens claim alleging that law enforcement had falsified
evidence and given false testimony to justify seizing a suspect.155 Like the
Eighth Circuit, it found the case presented a new context and that special
factors counseled against allowing it to proceed.156 Cantú arose from an FBI
sting operation in which an informant was setting up a drug sale.157 The
plaintiff alleged that FBI agents knew the operation was meant for another
person but let it proceed against Cantú anyway and then fabricated evidence

146. Id. at 500.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 500–01.
149. Id. at 501.
150. Id.
151. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2018)). The Hyde Amendment to the Equal Access to Justice
Act allows “a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation expenses, where the court finds
that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.” Id.
152. See Farah, 926 F.3d at 501. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1495 (2018) provide injunctive relief and damages for wrongfully convicted defendants,
respectively.
153. Farah, 926 F.3d at 501.
154. 933 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019).
155. See generally id.
156. See id. at 423.
157. See id. at 417.
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to justify the seizure.158 Cantú was arrested, tried, and then acquitted. After
his acquittal, Cantú sued the FBI agents that had allegedly fabricated
evidence to justify his initial seizure and sought Bivens damages for this
Fourth Amendment violation.159
The Fifth Circuit distilled Abbasi’s test into two simplified questions: (1)
do the plaintiff’s claims fall into one of the three existing Bivens actions?;
and (2) if not, should the court recognize a new Bivens action?160 First, the
court distinguished Cantú’s complaint from the 1971 Bivens case, reasoning
that the essence of the original case consisted of specific acts of home entry
in violation of one’s privacy.161 Cantú’s complaint, by contrast, lacked such
specificity and, moreover, any privacy violation was far more attenuated.162
Having established this “new context,” the court devoted most of its decision
to discussion of the special factors that prevented it from allowing the case
to proceed.163
Three special factors dissuaded the court from allowing the suit to move
forward. First, the FTCA already provided an elaborate statutory scheme
with the possibility of a damages remedy.164 Because the law enforcement
proviso of the FTCA waived sovereign immunity for certain torts, like some
of those alleged by Cantú, a Bivens remedy was not appropriate in light of
the FTCA’s available remedies.165
Second, the length of time that Congress had not affirmatively provided a
cause of action indicated that their silence was “more than mere
oversight.”166 The court reasoned that Congress understood, based on the
long line of Bivens cases at the Supreme Court, that extending Bivens
remedies to new contexts was disfavored by the judiciary.167 Given this
awareness of the status quo, Congress’s failure to enact a damages regime
was thus an affirmative statement that Congress did not approve of such an
action.168
Finally, “the nature of the underlying federal law enforcement activity”
was a stark contrast from the original Bivens case and also counseled
hesitation.169 Unlike the local nature of Bivens, this sting was part of a
“multi-jurisdictional investigation into transnational organized crime” with

158. Id.
159. Id. at 418.
160. Id. at 422.
161. Id. at 423.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018) (waiving sovereign immunity for false arrest,
abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, among other law enforcement misconduct).
166. Cantú, 933 F.3d at 423 (quoting Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 423–24.
169. See id. at 424.
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implications for border security.170 The three special factors thus combined
to counsel sufficient hesitation to reject a Bivens remedy under Abbasi.171
B. Falsification Claims Permitted: The Sixth Circuit in Jacobs and the
Ninth Circuit in Lanuza
Unlike the courts in the preceding subsection, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
have permitted falsification claims to proceed past the complaint stage. As
explained here, not only do these courts reach opposite results as those in
Part II.A, they also get there differently. Though the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits addressed each prong of the Abbasi framework, of the circuits in this
section, only the Ninth Circuit reached the special factors analysis.
1. Jacobs v. Alam
In Jacobs v. Alam,172 decided more than eighteen months after Abbasi, the
Sixth Circuit permitted a Bivens claim for fabrication of evidence, false
arrest, and malicious prosecution.173 Despite a colorful factual background
that strains credulity at times, the panel nevertheless found that these types
of claims were viable Bivens actions long available in the Sixth Circuit.174
The plaintiff’s complaint described a dramatic turn of events leading up to
the suit. In early January 2014, U.S. marshals searched the house above
Jacobs’s basement apartment looking for a fugitive related to Jacobs’s
neighbor and then “swept” Jacobs’s basement apartment when they were
unable to find the fugitive.175 When Jacobs came home to find his apartment
disheveled, he ran upstairs and encountered a stranger in his upstairs
neighbor’s house.176 Unaware that this was a U.S. marshal, Jacobs reached
for his holstered gun but before reaching it fell down the stairs, whereupon
he was shot three times by the officers.177 Criminal charges were brought
against Jacobs, but a jury acquitted him on all counts.178 He then brought a
Bivens action, alleging that the marshals had planted a bullet from his gun in
the upstairs apartment to bolster their claim that Jacobs fired at the
officers.179 He also claimed the officers lied at a preliminary examination
and at trial to support their story.180
For the Sixth Circuit, the claims were the kind of “run-of-the-mill
challenges” to law enforcement misconduct that Bivens was meant to

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019).
173. See id. at 1035.
174. See id. at 1038–39.
175. Id. at 1033.
176. Id. at 1033–34.
177. Id. at 1034.
178. Id. at 1035.
179. Id. at 1042.
180. See Jacobs v. Alam, No. 15-10516, 2017 WL 3616487, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23,
2017), aff’d, 915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019).
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address.181 A special factors analysis was unnecessary because these claims
did not present a new context in light of the circuit’s clear precedent
permitting fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution Bivens
claims.182 The only real question about the viability of the action stemmed
from the defendants’ argument that Sixth Circuit precedent should be
reexamined in light of the Abbasi decision.183 But the court would reject this
argument.184
Ultimately, the panel held that circuit precedent with respect to fabrication
of evidence and malicious prosecution claims was not inconsistent with
Abbasi.185 Though the court was answering a slightly different question—
whether Abbasi required reexamination of its prior Bivens jurisprudence—
the court’s analysis resembled the Abbasi framework nonetheless.186 That
is, the court found Jacobs did not present the “novel circumstances” that
existed in Abbasi, like a high-level policy challenge or a national security
issue, and thus its precedent need not be reexamined.187 Moreover, the panel
emphasized that the Abbasi Court itself affirmed the force of Bivens in these
kinds of cases.188 Not only did the federal judiciary have an especially
important role in affirming the guiding principles for law enforcement in the
search-and-seizure context, but this kind of Bivens claim was clearly settled
law.189 With the new context question settled, the special factors analysis
was unnecessary and the panel allowed the suit to proceed.190
2. Lanuza v. Love
Although the Ninth Circuit has aligned itself with the Sixth Circuit on the
viability of Bivens suits for falsification claims, it arrived there in a somewhat
different way. In Lanuza v. Love,191 the court ultimately permitted a claim
against an ICE attorney who had forged an immigration document, but only
after determining that there were no special factors to prevent extension of
Bivens into this new context.192 In contrast to Jacobs, the facts of Lanuza

181. Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1038 (noting the malicious prosecution, false arrest, fabrication
of evidence, and civil conspiracy claims in Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.
2015)).
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1036.
184. See id. at 1038.
185. See id. at 1036–37.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 1038.
188. Id. (explaining that Abbasi should not be understood to cast doubt on the viability of
Bivens in the law enforcement context).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 1039.
191. 899 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2018).
192. Id. at 1028. For more information about the facts of this case, see Mark Joseph Stern,
“This Case Is About a Lie,” SLATE (Aug. 16, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/08/ignacio-lanuza-got-deported-because-an-ice-agent-forged-a-document-icedidnt-care-until-lanuza-sued.html [https://perma.cc/9MXN-KPP3].
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made the new context obvious, which in turn made a special factors analysis
unavoidable under the Abbasi framework.193
The case concerned a Mexican national, Ignacio Lanuza, who had been
issued a final order of removal by an immigration judge after an ICE attorney
presented a form Lanuza had signed.194 The form interrupted the required
ten-year period of residency and thus rendered Lanuza ineligible for
cancellation of removal.195 But Lanuza’s counsel later determined that the
form had been forged.196 The ICE attorney who had forged the form would
eventually be criminally charged,197 but first, Lanuza sought Bivens damages
for this due process violation under the Fifth Amendment.198
All parties to the suit agreed that the circumstances presented a new
context.199 The panel’s analysis, therefore, immediately focused on
answering the special factors question.200 As Abbasi had counseled the lower
courts, the Ninth Circuit analyzed potential special factors with separationof-powers principles in mind.201 The court explained that Lanuza’s claim
did not challenge a policy decision of the political branches.202 It was not
aimed at a high-level executive, which the Court had warned could unduly
intrude on policy-forming deliberations, but at a low-level line prosecutor.203
Any potential foreign relations or diplomatic concerns that might arise from
the immigration context were thus not at stake.204
Outside the policy realm, the panel determined that Congress had not done
anything to indicate its desire for the judiciary to refrain from extending a
Bivens claim in this case.205 First, in contrast to other Bivens cases, there had
been no special interest in the case by the other branches of government.206
Second, the failure of the Immigration and Nationality Act207 (INA) to
193. See Lanuza, 899 F.3d at 1028.
194. See id. at 1021–22.
195. See id. at 1022; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2018) (establishing the cancellation of
removal process).
196. See Lanuza, 899 F.3d at 1022 (noting the seal of the Department of Homeland Security
on a form that predated the agency’s existence).
197. See Former Seattle Immigration Prosecutor Gets 30 Days for Forging Document,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016, 3:40 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/crime/former-seattle-immigration-lawyer-gets-30-days-for-forging-document/
[https://perma.cc/J5MU-9RVE].
198. See Lanuza, 899 F.3d at 1023. The Supreme Court has noted that “the Due Process
clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 693 (2001).
199. See Lanuza, 899 F.3d at 1028.
200. See id. at 1028–32.
201. See id. at 1028.
202. Id. at 1029.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1030.
205. See id.
206. Id. (The panel pointed directly to the diplomatic conversations between the United
States and Mexico surrounding the Hernández case).
207. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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provide for damages did not mean Congress disapproved of the remedy.
Rather, the statute’s provision defining when an immigration officer was
acting under the color of federal authority for liability purposes indicated that
Congress had actively understood that immigration officials might be subject
to suits such as Lanuza’s.208 Moreover, even if the INA provided some form
of alternative remedy, that process would be unavailable when the
misconduct was “designed to prevent individuals from accessing [the INA’s]
lawful forms of relief” in the first place.209 Finally, the panel explained that
falsification of evidence presented a concern especially important to the
courts: the integrity and credibility of the judicial system.210 To the extent
Bivens claims presented separation-of-powers concerns, this one in particular
also had special relevance for the deciding court.211
C. An Open Bivens Question: Unsettled Law in the First, Second, Third,
and Tenth Circuits
Though the preceding sections of this Note have focused on circuits that
directly address the post-Abbasi Bivens question, the Supreme Court has also
recognized that deferring the Bivens question to resolve the matter on other
grounds “is appropriate in many cases.”212 Perhaps with this in mind, other
courts have either deferred the Bivens question or ignored it altogether,
leaving the status of falsification claims unsettled despite the Court’s
refocused guidance in Abbasi. This section turns to these unsettled circuits.
1. The First Circuit in Pagán-González v. Moreno
The availability of falsification claims in the First Circuit post-Abbasi
cannot be assessed confidently from the current case law. On the one hand,
the court in Pagán-González v. Moreno213 expressly endorsed the viability
of a Bivens claim challenging a search based on officers’ deception by
denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.214 On the other hand, that panel
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a parallel malicious prosecution
claim arising from the same incident, though on the basis of qualified
immunity.215 As this subsection shows, the ambiguity in this decision
suggests the Bivens question for these kinds of claims may still be an open
one in the First Circuit. It is not fully clear how the malicious prosecution
dismissal should be understood: as a valid claim that simply failed on the

208. See Lanuza, 899 F.3d at 1030–31 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(8)).
209. Id. at 1032.
210. Id. at 1032–33. Accordingly, the courts were especially well equipped to “weigh the
costs of constitutional violations.” Id. at 1032.
211. See id. at 1033.
212. Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017); see also Stevens v. Osuna, 877
F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2017) (addressing immunity for an immigration judge rather than
an extension of a Bivens claim).
213. 919 F.3d 582 (1st Cir. 2019).
214. See id. at 602.
215. See id.
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merits or one in which the court assumed the claim without deciding its
viability, in order to dispose of it on other grounds.
In the suit, Pagán-González, the plaintiff, alleged that FBI agents deceived
his parents into consenting to a warrantless search.216 The agents, though
actually investigating suspicions of child pornography, procured consent to
search the plaintiff’s computer by telling his parents that a computer in their
house was sending viruses to Washington and they needed to address this
potential emergency.217 Under these false pretenses, the parents consented
to the warrantless search, which first led to the agents seizing the computer,
and then to the agents bursting into the house early the following morning to
arrest the plaintiff.218 Pagán-González was then arrested, detained for a week
because he could not post bond, and then indicted by a federal grand jury on
child pornography charges.219 After the government later dropped all
charges against Pagán-González, he filed the Bivens claim.220
The Pagán-González panel did not rely on Abbasi at all; the case was
decided nearly two years after Abbasi yet did not cite the decision.221 Nor
did it employ the two-step analysis in other post-Abbasi Bivens cases.222
Rather, the panel gave significant attention to the constitutional merits of the
alleged conduct, but not to the antecedent question of whether a Bivens claim
was even viable in this context.223 To the extent the First Circuit’s position
on the viability of these Bivens claims can be deduced, it must be done
indirectly. The court reinstated the challenge to the laptop search and
dismissed the malicious prosecution claim but only after an extensive
analysis finding the existence of qualified immunity.224 Consequently, it is
not entirely clear if, by addressing qualified immunity, Pagán-González
supports the viability of a malicious prosecution claim or if it was merely
assuming it without deciding. The panel’s omission of any reference to
Abbasi or analysis of the Bivens issue leaves this question unsettled.
2. The Second Circuit in Ganek v. Leibowitz
The Second Circuit’s only post-Abbasi decision to address a falsification
of evidence claim, Ganek v. Leibowitz,225 also leaves questions about the
viability of such a claim.226 Like the First Circuit, the Second Circuit ignored
the Bivens question and resolved the case on alternative grounds. It disposed
216. Id. at 586–87.
217. Id. at 587.
218. Id.
219. See González v. Moreno, 202 F. Supp. 3d 220, 223 (D.P.R. 2016), aff’d in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Pagán-González v. Moreno, 919 F.3d 582 (1st Cir. 2019).
220. Id.
221. Pagán-González was decided on March 22, 2019, and Abbasi on June 19, 2017.
222. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.2; infra Parts II.C.3–4.
223. See Pagán-González, 919 F.3d at 591–95 (home entry and computer search); id. at
601–02 (malicious prosecution).
224. See id. at 601–02.
225. 874 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2017).
226. See id. The case was decided on October 17, 2017, approximately four months after
Abbasi.
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of a Fourth Amendment claim on qualified immunity grounds and a Fifth
Amendment claim for failing to plead sufficiently plausible factual
allegations.227 In contrast to Pagán-González, Ganek provides a greater
degree of insight into the Second Circuit’s position on falsification claims, as
this subsection will detail.228 Still, by failing to address directly the Bivens
question in light of Abbasi, the Second Circuit’s position appears unsettled
as well.
In Ganek, an investment fund partner alleged that FBI agents had lied in
affidavits supporting a request for a search warrant when they indicated
Ganek was personally aware of insider trading information and its sources.229
Ganek’s claim arose from the government’s investigation and prosecution of
his hedge fund for insider trading.230 The FBI, aided by an informant
employee who would later plead guilty, first raided the fund’s offices.231 The
government indicted and tried one of Ganek’s employees based on material
obtained in the raid but never charged Ganek with any crime.232 At that trial,
testimony of both an employee and an FBI agent made it clear that nobody
had ever told the FBI that Ganek had received inside information, despite the
agent’s pre-warrant affidavit claiming otherwise.233 Upon learning this
information at trial, Ganek filed a Bivens claim alleging that the search was
unlawfully based on fabricated evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and that his Fifth Amendment right to due process had been
violated when his $400 million hedge fund folded as a result.234
The court ultimately dismissed both of his claims: the Fourth Amendment
claim on the basis of qualified immunity and the Fifth Amendment claim
because Ganek had not pleaded facts that could plausibly support it.235 In
terms of its Bivens analysis, however, the court said very little, despite ruling
on the case four months after the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into
Bivens with Abbasi. The decision’s one reference to Abbasi was a footnote
indicating it was assuming without deciding the availability of a Bivens
remedy for the Fifth Amendment due process claim.236 The court ostensibly
recognized a potential conflict between Abbasi and its own precedent on due
process claims, and so it sidestepped a potentially tricky question for an
easier one.237 Notably, the decision included no such footnote with respect
to the Fourth Amendment claim, which it also decided without addressing
the Bivens question. Perhaps that should then be understood as an
227. See id. at 90–91.
228. See supra Part II.C.1.
229. See Ganek, 874 F.3d at 78.
230. See Ganek v. Leibowitz, 167 F. Supp. 3d 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), rev’d in part, 874
F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2017).
231. See id. at 630.
232. See id. at 631.
233. See id. at 630–31.
234. See Ganek, 874 F.3d at 79.
235. See id. at 77, 90. For more about pleading standards, see supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
236. See Ganek, 874 F.3d at 90 n.11.
237. See id.
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endorsement of the Fourth Amendment claim. But even if much can be read
between the lines of the Ganek opinion, the lack of a definitive statement
regarding the availability of a Bivens claim in this context leaves the question
at least partially unanswered.238
3. The Third Circuit: Conflicting Decisions at the District Courts
Since Abbasi, the Third Circuit’s position on the viability of falsification
claims under Bivens appears unsettled as well. However, unlike the First and
Second Circuits, which have had panels resolve the claims on the merits
without addressing the Bivens question, the Third Circuit itself has not
decided such a case. Rather, as this subsection examines, cases at the district
level have reached conflicting conclusions.
In Karkalas v. Marks,239 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected a
doctor’s claim against an investigator and prosecutor for malicious
prosecution and knowingly testifying falsely to the grand jury.240 The court
analyzed the Bivens question under the Third Circuit’s version of the Abbasi
approach, which directed courts not only to determine if the case presented a
new context but also to perform an additional two-part inquiry into whether
an alternative remedial structure existed and whether there were special
factors that counseled hesitation.241 Despite this minor tweak of the
framework, the essential elements of Abbasi still guided its analysis.
The court first determined that Karkalas’s claim was meaningfully
different from Bivens, the closest potential Supreme Court analogue given its
grounding in the Fourth Amendment.242 Though the claim alleged a Fourth
Amendment violation, as in Bivens, the court characterized the claim at a
more granular level; its allegations of false statements to the jury in a
prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act thus constituted a new
context.243
Next, the court found an alternative remedial structure existed for this kind
of claim and, additionally, special factors prevented this new type of

238. District courts in the Second Circuit reflect the approach established by the Ganek
court. In Bey v. Fernandez, the court dismissed a malicious prosecution claim on qualified
immunity grounds without addressing the question of the claim’s viability. No. 15-CV7237(PKC)(ST), 2018 WL 4259865, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2018). Another district court,
in Parker v. Blackerby, dismissed a Bivens claim arising out of the arrest of a mental patient
who had threatened the president. 368 F. Supp. 3d 611, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 2019). By following
the approach of the Ganek panel, the district courts similarly suggest the availability of such
a claim though ultimately leave the question unsettled.
239. No. 19-948, 2019 WL 3492232 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2019).
240. See id. at *1. Karkalas brought the suit after being acquitted at trial for knowingly
prescribing a controlled substance. Id.
241. See id. at *7. In an unrelated Bivens case, decided two months after Abbasi, the Third
Circuit seemed to follow the Supreme Court’s test from Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550–
54 (2007), rather than the one provided in Abbasi. See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d
189, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2017).
242. Karkalas, 2019 WL 3492232, at *9–10.
243. Id.
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claim.244 With respect to a remedial structure, the Hyde Amendment
permitted an award of attorney’s fees for bad-faith prosecutions, and
Congress had also passed a law allowing damages for unjust convictions.245
That Karkalas did not seek fees under the Hyde Amendment (and though his
codefendants were denied them) did not diminish the structure’s existence.246
As to special factors, the court noted three principal concerns. First, the claim
would have to inquire into the secrecy of grand jury testimony.247 Second,
one of the defendants was a “diversion investigator,” not a typical law
enforcement officer familiar with probable cause standards.248 Third, the
Ryan Haight Act Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2008249 (the
“Ryan Haight Act”), which amended the Controlled Substances Act in 2008
to allow states to sue online pharmacy companies for damages, expressly
noted that it did not create a private right of action.250
Other district courts in the Third Circuit dismissed similar Bivens claims.
In one such case, a court dismissed a malicious prosecution suit because that
kind of claim did not resemble any of the Supreme Court’s three Bivens
endorsements; it did not even address special factors.251 In another, Lee v.
Janosko,252 a coerced confession amounted to a new context and was barred
by special factors.253 The court reasoned that Congress had addressed
coerced confessions by prohibiting their admissibility at trial but
purposefully had not provided a damages remedy.254 It also noted the
chilling effect such suits would have on law enforcement and the potential to
flood the federal courts with constitutional damages claims.255
But another district court reached an altogether opposite conclusion.256 In
Graber v. Dales,257 a Secret Service agent allegedly lied in an affidavit
supporting an arrest warrant resulting from Graber’s protests at the
Democratic National Convention.258 The claim was ultimately allowed to
244. See id. at *11.
245. See id. See also supra note 151 for more on the Hyde Amendment and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (2018) pertaining to unjust convictions.
246. Karkalas, 2019 WL 3492232, at *11.
247. Id. at *12.
248. Id.
249. Pub. L. No. 110-425, 122 Stat. 4820 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
250. See Karkalas, 2019 WL 3492232, at *13. The Ryan Haight Act was primarily aimed
“to address the problem of rogue Internet pharmacies.” S. REP. NO. 110-521, at 2 (2008).
251. See Lane v. Schade, No. 15-01568(PGS)(LHG), 2018 WL 4571672, at *7 (D.N.J.
Sept. 24, 2018).
252. No. 2:18-CV-01297, 2019 WL 2392661 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2019).
253. See id. at *4–6.
254. See id. at *5 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2018)). In Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 444 (2000), the Supreme Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was unconstitutional to
the extent that it attempted to override the Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
255. Lee, 2019 WL 2392661, at *5 (citing Vennes v. An Unknown No. of Unidentified
Agents, 26 F.3d 1448, 1452 (8th Cir. 1994)).
256. See Graber v. Dales, No. 18-3168, 2019 WL 4805241, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019).
257. No. 18-3168, 2019 WL 4805241 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019).
258. Id. at *3.
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proceed after the court determined the new context question was a “close
call,” but, regardless, there were no special factors.259 The court was
conflicted about whether to characterize the claim as a seizure without
probable cause—which would not constitute a new context—or if the
differences between the case at hand and Bivens—even if trivial—amounted
to an extension under Abbasi.260 The plaintiff’s special factors argument
clarified any uncertainty; it persuaded the court that the classification of the
event as a “National Special Security Event” was unrelated to the national
security policy at issue in Abbasi.261 Moreover, the affidavit was not a heatof-the-moment decision implicating the Secret Service’s instant reactions but
a measured statement after the suspect was already in custody.262
The law in the Third Circuit, lacking a decision by the circuit court itself
to clarify the conflicting district court decisions, thus remains unsettled with
respect to Bivens claims addressing falsification by law enforcement. Unlike
the First and Second Circuits, however, it is a result of unresolved conflict
rather than lack of guidance on the post-Abbasi Bivens question.
4. The Tenth Circuit: The District of Colorado in Boudette v. Sanders
A Tenth Circuit appellate panel has not yet addressed the viability of a
falsification claim under the Supreme Court’s refined Bivens framework.
But in Boudette v. Sanders,263 the District of Colorado determined that a
Bivens remedy for malicious prosecution is categorically unavailable under
Abbasi.264 Though a magistrate judge had determined that Abbasi did not
preclude a Bivens suit for malicious prosecution, the district court rejected
that part of the recommendation in Boudette.265
The suit alleged that a DEA agent made false statements in an affidavit to
procure a search warrant.266 After a lengthy analysis of the new Abbasi
standard, the court briefly concluded that the suit would intrude into the
decision-making of prosecutors and thus presented a new context relative to
the Supreme Court’s three Bivens cases.267 Turning to special factors, the
court found that the low bar for dismissal established under Abbasi had been
met by the risk that the suit would “interfere with prosecutorial discretion”
or disincentivize cooperation between both law enforcement and
prosecutors—and between citizens and law enforcement.268
Like the other circuits examined in Part II.C, the Tenth Circuit’s view on
the viability of falsification claims is ultimately unsettled. Unlike the others,

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
No. 18-CV-02420-CMA-MEH, 2019 WL 3935168 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2019).
Id. at *5.
See id.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *7.
Id.
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however, that is not because of a failure to address the issue269 or a conflict
among the district courts.270 Rather, the Boudette court’s decision staked a
clear position as to the viability of these kinds of suits; they are not
permissible following Abbasi. But until the district court’s holding in
Boudette is further developed by other district courts in the circuit, or the
circuit itself, the court’s holding stands on uncertain ground.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ABBASI “ELEMENTS” IN THE CURRENT
LANDSCAPE: NEW CONTEXT, SPECIAL FACTORS, AND ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIAL STRUCTURES
As Part II describes, the viability of Bivens claims arising from
falsification of evidence varies widely.271 Having laid out the landscape of
cases and their divergent results across the circuits, this section compares
these cases from the perspective of the Abbasi “elements”: new context,
special factors, and alternative remedial structures. Because much of each
court’s analysis is driven by the facts of the specific complaint, a definitive,
results-focused determination of whether a falsification claim is allowed
proves difficult in the abstract. As a result, Part III dissects these cases into
their component parts under Abbasi to better understand how each
component functions in falsification claims. While questions concerning the
potential existence of a new context, special factors, and an alternative
remedial structure overlap, addressing each separately allows for a narrower
guidepost and a more direct comparison to Abbasi itself.
A. Step One: A New Context?
The question of whether a suit presents a new Bivens context is especially
important in determining the viability of the claim. As Abbasi established, if
the case does not present a new context, the claim may proceed; a special
factors analysis is unnecessary.272 Because the Supreme Court has not
addressed a falsification claim directly, there is some breathing space for the
circuit courts to determine if this kind of claim presents a new context. The
circuits have mostly explored this space in terms of how they address this
question, rather than the answer they reach. For the most part, falsification
claims have constituted a new Bivens context.
Generally, the cases present four kinds of new context analyses: (1) those
determining if Abbasi requires reexamination of established precedent; (2)
those applying Abbasi’s guidance directly to the falsification context; (3)
those assessing new context in terms of the factual circumstances at hand;
and (4) those ignoring the new context analysis altogether. The Sixth Circuit,
which had clearly established the viability of these kinds of claims prior to
Abbasi, held that nothing in Abbasi required the court to reexamine the
269. See supra Parts II.C.1–2.
270. See supra Part II.C.3.
271. See supra Part II.
272. See Zipursky, supra note 130, at 2172 (explaining that “nearly any kind of difference
will create an obligation to consider ‘special factors’”); see also supra Part I.D.
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validity of that precedent.273 Though it set out to answer whether
reexamination was required—a slightly different question—in doing so, the
Sixth Circuit essentially determined it was not a new context under Abbasi.
By distinguishing Abbasi from the case at hand, rather than analogizing it to
the three prior Supreme Court cases, the court found that the Abbasi new
context analysis was unnecessary. Similarly, a district court in the Third
Circuit appeared inclined to find that false testimony in an affidavit
supporting an arrest warrant was not a new context.274 But since it was a
“close call,” it assumed the new context and decided on special factors.275
In contrast, other courts have strongly intimated the falsification of
evidence itself presented a new context. In Cantú, the Fifth Circuit found
that the law enforcement conduct at issue could not be reconciled with what
happened in Bivens and thus was a new context.276 Similarly, much of the
Eighth Circuit’s analysis in Farah spoke to the falsification issue at least
indirectly; the case-building nature and the indirect injury were both
meaningful differences.277 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, differing
from another district in the Third Circuit, found that false testimony to the
grand jury presented a new context.278
In other cases, the factual circumstances were so different from the
Supreme Court’s three cases that the lower courts considered the context to
be new without much consideration of the falsification issue. For example,
when the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a forged document in a
deportation proceeding presented a new context, it emphasized the actor—a
federal immigration prosecutor—and the setting—a deportation
proceeding.279
But many of the cases avoided the new context analysis altogether.
Though the First and Second Circuits each had a history of permitting
fabricated evidence and malicious prosecution Bivens claims before Abbasi,
neither performed a new context analysis in the post-Abbasi cases.280 These
courts ruled on motions to dismiss based either on qualified immunity or
pleading standards, rather than employing the Abbasi framework. This may
suggest the courts did not view these claims as a new context, but the failure
to address the question ultimately leaves it open.
In sum, the lower courts’ treatment of the Abbasi new context question is
by no means perfectly consistent, but it mostly arrives at the same result.
Some courts directly identify the circumstances of falsification as a new
context; others have determined the claim to be a new context but based on
factual circumstances unrelated to falsification; and still others have avoided
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
2019).
280.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Graber v. Dales).
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Graber v. Dales).
See supra Part II.A.2; see also Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 423 (5th Cir. 2019).
See supra Part II.A.1; see also Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 499 (8th Cir. 2019).
See supra Part II.C.3 (contrasting Karkalas with Graber).
See supra Part II.B.2; see also Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1027–28 (9th Cir.
See supra Parts II.C.1–2.
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the analysis altogether. Only the Sixth Circuit has been sufficiently satisfied
that the falsification claim did not present a new context as to forgo the
special factors question altogether. Considering the significant conflicts in
terms of special factors and alternative remedies, which the next two
subsections address, this near-consensus on new context constitutes a degree
of consistency. Because the new context question is the only truly dispositive
element of the test—a case may proceed, even in the presence of special
factors, if it is not a new context—this tendency to find a new context puts
even more weight on the special factors analysis.
B. Step Two: Special Factors?
While Part III.A shows that the first step of the Abbasi framework has
produced mild variation among the lower courts, Abbasi’s second step opens
the door to a far wider array of potentially relevant considerations. Adding
to the complexity of this task is the lack of a baseline for special factors.
Abbasi provided an inherent baseline for comparison for the new context
question, namely the cases that constitute the “old” context.281 The
guidelines for the special factors analysis, on the other hand, are less
concrete. As Part I.D set out, the Supreme Court sought to focus the attention
of lower courts on special factors that would implicate separation-of-powers
concerns. But it did not provide a hypothetical list of examples of special
factors, as it had for the new context question.282 As a result, lower courts
have looked to both the specific special factors presented in Abbasi and also
to any other special factor that implicates separation of powers.
Unsurprisingly, as Part II detailed on a case-by-case basis, this has produced
conflict as to which factors to use, on the one hand, and whether the factor is
in fact special enough to counsel hesitation, on the other. This section
develops this conflict, drawing out pivotal differences in the often-dispositive
domain of the special factors analysis.
For cases in which courts determine that special factors do not exist, there
are generally three approaches employed. First, the court may examine the
special factors present in Abbasi and then determine that those are absent in
the case at hand. For the most part, the Ninth Circuit relied on this approach
in Lanuza. There, the plaintiff’s claim was permitted to proceed because he
had not challenged executive policy or the conduct of high-level officials
and, additionally, congressional silence with respect to a damages remedy
did not equate to disapproval.283 In essence, the Abbasi factors were absent.
Second, a court may reject the special factors that inevitably will be
proposed by the defendant. The Sixth Circuit did this implicitly when it
simply ignored the officers’ argument that the impact on the “U.S. Marshals
Service systemwide operations” was a special factor.284 The district court in
281. See supra Part I.D.
282. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Part II.B.2.
284. Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Raymon Alam & David Weinman at 9, Jacobs
v. Alam, 915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1224), 2018 WL 3617091, at *9.
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Graber was more direct: it expressly rejected the defendant’s argument that
the Secret Service’s designation of the Democratic National Convention as a
“National Special Security Event” was a special factor.285 National security
policy, it held, was a valid special factor when it was legitimately at issue,
but that had not been the case there.286
Third, the court might hypothesize special factors that, had they been
present, would prevent a Bivens claim. In their absence, then, the court
allows the claim to proceed. For example, the Ninth Circuit conceded that
immigration, at its highest levels, could implicate foreign policy and
diplomacy, which were indeed matters best left to the political branches.287
But when the matter only consisted of one person’s mistreatment at the hands
of a low-level prosecutor, foreign relations and diplomacy would be
irrelevant.288 Similarly, the Graber court recognized that second-guessing a
Secret Service agent’s split-second decision in a life-or-death matter would
be problematic, but the facts of the case at issue had not presented such a
condition.289
On the other hand, courts that find special factors often use the special
factors outlined in Abbasi as models, but do not always limit themselves to
these factors. Intrusion into the executive branch and congressional inaction,
which the Abbasi Court addressed, arise most frequently.290 But beyond the
Abbasi factors, the unique facts of the case—for example, the nature of the
law enforcement action or the type of officer being sued—often come into
the special factors discussion.291
Turning to intrusion into the executive branch, a concern pulled directly
from Abbasi, courts have found a variety of circumstances that fall under this
umbrella. Interference with the prosecutorial process has constituted such an
intrusion.292 The risk of chilling communication between prosecutors and
officers or between law enforcement and the public has been deemed another
intrusion.293 Piercing the veil of the grand jury, as might be required in a
case alleging false testimony by a law enforcement officer, is another activity
best avoided by the judiciary.294 Other Abbasi considerations, like national
security and foreign policy, appear as well.295

285. Graber v. Dales, No. 18-3168, 2019 WL 4805241, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019).
286. Id.
287. See Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2018).
288. See id.
289. See Graber, 2019 WL 4805241, at *5.
290. See supra Part II.
291. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2 (examining Cantú); supra Part II.C.3 (examining
Karkalas).
292. See supra Part II.B.1.
293. See supra Part II.C.4.
294. See, e.g., Karkalas v. Marks, No. 19-948, 2019 WL 3492232, at *11–12 (E.D. Pa. July
31, 2019) (“The secrecy of grand jury proceedings counsels against implying a Bivens
action.”).
295. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing foreign policy); supra Part II.C.3 (discussing
national security).
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Next, courts interpret the action or inaction of Congress in various
circumstances as a proxy for its intent that the courts should not provide a
damages remedy. Often, a relevant statute that fails to provide a damages
remedy might suggest this desire. Multiple courts have found that the Hyde
Amendment’s provision to award attorney’s fees for bad-faith
prosecutions—but no other monetary damages—implies that Congress
intended to draw a clear line at that remedy.296 Other courts have reached a
similar conclusion with respect to the Ryan Haight Act and 18 U.S.C
§ 3501.297 Even in the absence of a relevant statute, certain courts have relied
on congressional silence—on its own—to conclude that the judiciary should
not provide a damages remedy for the unconstitutional conduct at issue. In
Cantú, the Fifth Circuit panel referred to the “length of time” that Congress
was aware of the Supreme Court’s “disfavored” disposition towards creating
new Bivens claims.298 Accordingly, Congress’s failure to create a remedy
must be understood as an affirmative endorsement of that holding.
Finally, these falsification cases have encompassed new special factors
beyond the scope of Abbasi and more narrowly tailored to the specific case
at issue. The nature of law enforcement’s activity is one such circumstance
that applies.299 For example, the investigation of “transnational organized
crime” proved to be a special factor for the Fifth Circuit.300 Another court
found a special factor in a defendant’s job as a DEA “diversion investigator”
because this less traditional law enforcement role meant that she was
unfamiliar with the probable cause standard essential to malicious
prosecution claims.301 These ad hoc special factors thus round out the types
of special factors commonly found in the post-Abbasi falsification claims.
C. A “Special” Special Factor?: Alternative Remedial Structures
Part II, in its review of the post-Abbasi landscape of falsification cases,
introduced cases in which existence of an alternative remedial structure
warranted dismissal.302 That analysis derived from Abbasi itself. There, the
Court drew on its prior Bivens jurisprudence303 to explain that, when an
alternative remedial structure existed, “that alone” might be sufficient to
prohibit a court from inferring a Bivens action.304 Of the conflicts that arise
from this element of Abbasi, most important to falsification claims is the
296. See Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 2019); Karkalas, 2019 WL 3492232,
at *11.
297. See Karkalas, 2019 WL 3492232, at *13 (discussing the Ryan Haight Act); Lee v.
Janosko, No. 2:18-CV-01297, 2019 WL 2392661, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2019) (describing
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2018)).
298. Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). The “disfavored” term was first
used in Iqbal but, as Part I explained, the Court had not extended Bivens to a new context since
Carlson. See supra Part I.C.
299. See Cantú, 933 F.3d at 424.
300. Id.
301. Karkalas, 2019 WL 3492232, at *13.
302. See supra Parts II.A.1–2, II.C.3.
303. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
304. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017).
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dispute about whether the court should focus on the formal existence of a
structure or, conversely, on the meaningfulness of the remedy it provides in
the specific case. Relatedly, courts disagree on how various statutory
regimes fit, if at all, into this structure.
This subsection shows how the courts, in attempting to understand
properly what constitutes an alternative remedial structure, engage in a
functionalist-formalist debate of sorts with the respect to the possibility of
relief. That is, for some courts, the mere existence of the structure, regardless
of its accessibility to the specific plaintiff or its adequacy, is sufficient. The
Eighth Circuit, for example, reasoned that the lack of a remedy for the
plaintiff was unfortunate but not a proper basis for a Bivens claim given the
existence of a remedial scheme.305 By contrast, other courts have found that
the unavailability of relief for the plaintiff in practical terms meant the
scheme was inadequate and thus would not bar a Bivens claim.306
More often, though, courts dive into the specific statutory schemes
relevant to the complaint at hand.307 Of course, the distinction between
courts’ discussions of statutory schemes under the rubric of special factors
versus alternative remedies is subtle. In the former scenario, the statutes
speak to whether the failure to provide a damages remedy was an intentional
decision by Congress. In the latter, the statutes speak less to congressional
intent and more to whether, out of prudential considerations imposed by the
Supreme Court, a sufficient remedial structure exists to make judicial
involvement unnecessary. Either way, statutes that qualify as an alternative
remedial structure in one court often fail in others.308 One of which, the
FTCA, is especially relevant to falsification claims because it expressly
allows suits for certain intentional torts against law enforcement officers that
would otherwise be unactionable, such as false arrest, abuse of process, and
malicious prosecution.309 Many, if not all, Bivens claims alleging
falsification of evidence would thus potentially give rise to suit under the
FTCA as well, so preclusion would be especially impactful.
The Fifth Circuit raised the very possibility that the FTCA could operate
as an alternative remedial structure to bar falsification claims in the Bivens
context. In Cantú, the first special factor that the Fifth Circuit listed was the
statutory scheme provided by the FTCA.310 Other courts, outside the

305. See supra Part II.A.1.
306. See supra Part II.B. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit also embraced this “functionalist”
approach in a nonfalsification Bivens case, Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018).
The court addressed a list of potential sources of compensation for the plaintiff, all of which
were unavailable for Rodriguez. Id. at 739–43. Damages under the FTCA were unavailable
because of the foreign country exception; a state-law tort action was barred by the Westfall
Act; restitution under the criminal proceeding against the defendant was inadequate; and a suit
in Mexico was not feasible. Id.
307. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.3
308. Compare supra Part II.A.1, and supra Part II.C.3, with supra Part II.B.2.
309. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2018); supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing
the law enforcement proviso further).
310. See Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 423 (5th Cir. 2019).
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falsification context, occasionally reach a similar conclusion.311 For the most
part, however, courts addressing Bivens falsification claims do not even
address the FTCA as a potential bar via the alternative remedial structure
route.312 Parallel FTCA actions in Lanuza, Jacobs, and Farah did not enter
into the Bivens analysis for the courts that decided those cases.313 Even in
the midst of narrowing the availability of Bivens claims, the Supreme Court
has still affirmed its conclusion that “Congress views FTCA and Bivens as
parallel, complementary causes of action” grounded in the legislative history
of the FTCA itself.314
The status of less prominent statutory provisions and schemes is less
clearly established. The Hyde Amendment, which allows recovery of
reasonable attorney’s fees for bad-faith prosecutions, is especially pertinent
given the frequency with which plaintiffs in this context have been acquitted
of criminal charges.315 The Eighth Circuit concluded that a Bivens remedy
would “upset the existing ‘remedial structure’” established by Congress
through the Hyde Amendment and the statutes permitting damages against
the government for wrongful convictions.316 Only one other court, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, introduced this scheme as a potential
alternative remedy.317 And a case two months later in the same court ignored
both statutes as it permitted a suit based on a Secret Service agent’s falsified
affidavit.318
In sum, alternative remedial structures, which are clearly relevant
considerations in the Supreme Court’s Bivens cases, present even more
unanswered questions for the lower courts in post-Abbasi falsification
claims. Courts differ on whether to treat alternative remedies as a separate
bar or a special factor, which, in turn, affects the weight given to the
alternative remedy. Similarly, though most courts appear to treat potentially
overlapping FTCA and Bivens suits as complementary and not
interchangeable, at least one does not.319 Other statutory regimes, such as
311. See, e.g., Rivera v. Samilo, 370 F. Supp. 3d 362, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (FTCA was an
“alternative avenue for redress” in an excessive force Bivens case); Abdoulaye v. Cimaglia,
15-CV-4921 (PKC), 2018 WL 1890488, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (FTCA as a potential
remedy counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens claim.). But see Oliva v. United States,
EP-18-CV-00015-FM, 2019 WL 136909, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2019) (FTCA was not
alternative remedy for an excessive force claim.).
312. See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 133 (2009). The expansion of the FTCA to
include certain intentional torts by law enforcement officers was designed to supplement, not
displace the Bivens action. Id.
313. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1–2.
314. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537,
553 (2007); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983). For more on the complementary nature
of the FTCA and Bivens, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Parts II.A.1–2, II.B.1.
316. Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 502 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513
(2018), which establishes the cause of action to sue the government for damages up to $50,000
for each year of wrongful incarceration (and $100,000 for each year if sentenced to death)).
317. See Karkalas v. Marks, No. 19-948, 2019 WL 3492232 at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2019).
318. See Graber v. Dales, No. 18-3168, 2019 WL 4805241, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019).
319. See supra Part II.A.2
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certain statutes governing bad-faith prosecutions and unjust convictions, are
even more widely contested.
IV. SECOND-GUESSING BIVENS?: A POLICY-FOCUSED RESOLUTION
Given the divergent results laid out in Part II and the conflicting
interpretations of the Abbasi elements in Part III, it would be tempting to try
to formulate a bright-line rule as to whether falsification of evidence claims
are permitted under the Abbasi framework. However, the fact-specific and
multifactored nature of Justice Kennedy’s test would make any rule too rigid
to be helpful. Rather, Part IV offers more definitive guidance on how each
element of the Abbasi framework—new context, special factors, and
alternative remedial structures—should be understood in falsification claims.
These suggestions are grounded within the Abbasi framework to be
compatible with the current Court’s focus on separation of powers but also
steeped in the traditional deterrence rationale of Bivens.320 Ultimately, a
proper understanding of these two guideposts points to the idea that courts
should reject extending Bivens claims when the suit would require the courts
to second-guess the policy of one of the political branches.
Fleshing out this idea, Part IV.A first argues that falsification claims will
almost always amount to a new context as the term is expressed in Abbasi.
Additionally, although Abbasi recognized both law enforcement’s and
citizens’ reliance interests in the guidance provided by Bivens suits, lower
court precedent that predates Abbasi should always be reexamined. Next,
Part IV.B argues that the separation-of-powers focus at the heart of Abbasi’s
special factors analysis is best understood as prohibiting courts from secondguessing policy. Part IV.C then suggests a practical and flexible test for
determining whether a statutory regime constitutes an alternative remedial
structure which bars a Bivens claim.
Finally, this section offers a brief coda contending that the nature of the
harm in falsification claims has special relevance in answering the Bivens
question posed in Abbasi. Though Abbasi is typically viewed as being on the
other end of the spectrum from Bivens, the underlying interests are actually
not too far apart, especially as they relate to falsification claims. As this
section explains, Abbasi’s focus on separation of powers is really about
policy, whereas the original three Bivens cases were grounded in deterring
constitutional violations. But these are actually two sides of the same coin.
Deterrence cannot be achieved when an officer is merely carrying out policy.
Ultimately, this section’s application of Abbasi to the current landscape of
falsification claims is more about finding the common ground—rather than
the space—between Abbasi and Bivens.

320. See supra Parts I.B–C; supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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A. New Context Renewed
Of the three disputed elements of the Abbasi framework, the new context
inquiry appears to be the most settled.321 Putting aside the circuits that have
not directly addressed the Bivens question,322 only one has found that a
falsification claim failed to present a new context.323 The Abbasi Court was
clear that the baseline of comparison for a new context should be the three
cases in which it endorsed a Bivens claim.324 Accordingly, only Bivens itself
will likely be applicable to claims involving fabrication of evidence,
misrepresentations to the grand jury, and malicious prosecution. Though
these claims may check off many of the boxes from the suggested points of
comparison in Abbasi,325 the dispositive question is whether the case differs
“in a meaningful way.”326 These kinds of claims almost certainly will. At
its core, Bivens is concerned with the vindication of constitutionally
protected privacy interests, as to both body and property,327 that are simply
not present in the falsification claims. That is not to say that the constitutional
violations at issue in falsification claims are less meaningful or less worthy
of relief. Rather, as most courts already recognize, they simply constitute a
new context under Abbasi and thus warrant further discussion under the
special factors analysis.
The Sixth Circuit’s new context analysis, however, raises an additional and
important question: how are courts to treat their own pre-Abbasi
precedent?328 That is, must settled law be reopened and compared to the
three Supreme Court cases? For the Sixth Circuit, its own well-established
Bivens claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution
essentially preempt the new context question.329 While that would seem to
conflict with Abbasi to the extent that existing precedent differs from the
three Supreme Court–approved contexts, the Sixth Circuit’s position is not
unreasonable in light of the Abbasi Court’s particular emphasis on the stare
decisis interest for claims in the law enforcement sphere.330 There is
undoubtedly value in affirming established boundaries for law enforcement
where the other side of that line often means an unconstitutional deprivation
of liberty.331 Given the gravity of the consequences, then, it might be
preferable for the rules relied on by law enforcement to stand.
Yet the very fact that the Abbasi Court considered the stare decisis interest
in its new framework ultimately underscores that courts must reexamine their
321. See supra Part III.A.
322. See generally supra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing the First and Second Circuits).
323. See supra Part II.B.1.
324. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).
325. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. The list the Court provided, however,
was merely illustrative.
326. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859.
327. See supra Part I.B.
328. See supra Part III.A.
329. See supra Part II.B.1.
330. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Parts II.A.1–2, II.B.1 (discussing cases where the plaintiffs were detained
for extended periods of time).
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pre-Abbasi precedent when challenged. The Court carefully recognized and
then weighed the special reliance concerns presented in the sphere of law
enforcement but nevertheless imposed the new context prong of its new
Bivens test.332 Therefore, even in circuits where precedent permits
falsification claims to proceed under Bivens, those claims present a new
context under Abbasi. It does not follow, however, that such precedent must
be overturned. Rather, Abbasi requires that Bivens claims for fabrication of
evidence and malicious prosecution, even if permitted under established
precedent, undergo a special factors analysis.
B. Special Factors as Separation of Policy
In contrast to the lower courts’ near-consensus on the new context
question,333 the post-Abbasi courts agree far less on what amounts to a
special factor.334 Part III.B presented an empirical inquiry into how special
factors impact recent falsification claims, ultimately finding significant
conflicts across the circuits.335 This section addresses the two conflicts that
came to the forefront. First is the question of what Abbasi’s guidance on
special factors means on a practical level. Using the FTCA’s discretionary
function exemption as an example, this section suggests that courts
addressing falsification claims should understand Abbasi’s focus on
separation of powers to be about second-guessing policy decisions. Second,
this section argues that the three most prominent special factors in the postAbbasi landscape are best understood not to constitute special factors in light
of this reoriented policy focus.
This reframing of the separation-of-powers analysis is especially
important given the contradictory nature of the inquiry. On the one hand,
there is arguably an inherent presumption in favor of allowing a new Bivens
remedy based on the mechanics of the test. The burden, if you will, is on the
defendant to show that a special factor counselling hesitation exists in the
first place.336 On the other hand, courts have found that the threshold for a
consideration to become a special factor is quite low—a moment of hesitation
is all that may be required.337 In reality, then, even if the defendant is
required to affirmatively point to a special factor, that is hardly a high bar to
clear. Further, the plaintiff is also tasked with the philosophical hurdle of
proving the absence of special factors. The Abbasi framework is not a formal
burden-shifting test, so a plaintiff’s falsification claim would almost always
affirmatively assert that all potential special factors are absent.338 Thus, the
plaintiff essentially has the added difficulty of proving a negative. Though
the inconsistency across the courts, on its own, suggests the need for a more
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 283–302 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.D.

1432

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

workable understanding of special factors, the inherent contradictions in the
framework make this section’s proposal all the more necessary. The policy
focus proposed in this section does just that.
1. The Abbasi Special Factors Reconsidered
To resolve the lower courts’ disagreements on which considerations rise
to the level of a special factor in falsification claims, Abbasi’s guidance must
be reconsidered. It is pivotal to center that discussion on separation of
powers, the Court’s principal focus,339 but that is not enough. According to
Abbasi, a special factor arises when a relevant concern of the case presents a
separation-of-powers problem.340 While that may provide a compass
towards a desired Bivens outcome, it is hardly a map. More guidance is
required if special factors are to be applied consistently in falsification
claims. To that end, it cannot be sufficient that separation of powers is
merely implicated. After all, a Bivens claim, by definition, will at the very
least involve multiple branches of government. In each suit, a citizen seeks
a judgment from the courts imposing damages on an executive or legislative
official for violating rights protected by the Constitution. There must,
therefore, be a boundary where the separation-of-powers concern becomes
so insurmountable that the suit must be dismissed on its face. And there is:
second-guessing the policy decisions of the political branches. The Court’s
Bivens jurisprudence, and Abbasi specifically, emphasized that “a Bivens
action is not ‘a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy.’”341 But that is
not a mere corollary to the separation-of-powers concerns—that is the
concern. That the Abbasi Court addressed that issue first, before getting into
the case-specific special factors, speaks to its profound importance.342
Consequently, Abbasi is best understood as saying that separation-of-powers
concerns become insurmountable when a case requires the judiciary to
second-guess the policy decision of another branch of government.
The discretionary function exception to the FTCA provides a model for
this principle. Despite the FTCA’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity for
torts committed by government employees, the discretionary function
exception bars recovery where an employee’s wrongdoing resulted from
carrying out an agency policy.343 In the same way that the discretionary
function exception’s restrictions still permit suits for discretionary decisions
unrelated to policy, so too should Abbasi’s limitations still allow suits for
rogue action unrelated to policy. Though the government’s broad acceptance
of vicarious liability in the FTCA would seem to be the total opposite of a
Bivens suit, which is aimed only at a federal official in his or her personal
capacity, that is not the case. As in Abbasi, separation of powers is at the
core of the judiciary’s interpretation of the discretionary function
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

See supra notes 113–13 and accompanying text.
See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
Id. at 1860 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)).
See supra notes 123–21 and accompany text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

2020]

BREAKING BIVENS?

1433

exception.344 If the principal question, then, is whether a specific suit would
infringe on another branch of government, the fact that the Court was
interpreting a statute does not rob it of its persuasiveness. Moreover,
regardless of whether the original Bivens case would have been decided
differently today, the Court has accepted it for the judicially inferred remedy
that it is.345
The unspoken problem, then, seems to revert back to the modern
judiciary’s discomfort with creating causes of action.346 Yet that concern lies
outside the four corners of Abbasi. Given Abbasi’s clear acknowledgement
that courts may infer new Bivens claims (the second prong of the framework
would, after all, be superfluous if a new context always barred suit), that
argument attacks the existence of all Bivens claims in a way that Abbasi did
not. First, it bears repeating that the Bivens remedy is more accurately
described as judicially implied than judicially created. The remedy is not
judge-made so much as it is a derivative of the rights guaranteed in the
Constitution.347 But more importantly, the Court has already accepted the
judicially inferred nature of the suit. Therefore, when the Abbasi Court
refocused the Bivens inquiry on separation of powers, the judicial “creation”
of a cause of action was already priced in. True, the Court likely would have
decided Bivens differently if it heard the case today, but its judicially implied
nature has nonetheless been affirmed.348 The inquiry, then, must be about
something else: judicial second-guessing of the political branches’ policy
decisions.
2. Reapplying Special Factors to Falsification Claims
The preceding subsection refined the general directions Abbasi provided
for the special factors analysis in new Bivens claims into a more functional
roadmap. Rather than addressing claims under the nebulous auspices of
separation-of-powers principles in the abstract, the conflicting view on
special factors can now be understood in light of the policy second-guessing
that lies at the core of Abbasi. The most pressing conflicts are thus whether
to treat the following as special factors: (1) intrusion into the functions of
law enforcement, (2) congressional inaction or silence, and (3) the nature of
344. See Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that the discretionary function exception is “[g]rounded in separation of powers
concerns”).
345. See supra Parts I.C–D (discussing the modern Bivens doctrine). But see Wilkie v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Bivens should be
limited to its facts).
346. See, e.g., supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text (examining the Cantú court’s
unwillingness to create a cause of action); see also Bandes, supra note 58, at 294 (discussing
an alternate theory envisioning a more expansive Bivens doctrine where “the separation of
powers principle demands judicial enforcement” even without any congressional
authorization (emphasis added)).
347. See supra Part I.B. In the original Bivens case, Justice Blackmun recognized the
comparison to the other judicially implied remedies for Fourth Amendment violations—the
exclusionary rule and injunctive relief. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part I.C (discussing the progression of the modern Bivens doctrine).
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the law enforcement activity. Ultimately, the lessons of the preceding section
suggest that these concerns will not rise to the level of special factors that
preclude a Bivens claim.
a. Interference with the Political Branches
One of the most glaring points of contention for post-Abbasi falsification
claims is whether the burden of a Bivens suit on the executive branch amounts
to a special factor.349 The idea is that a suit would impermissibly intrude into
the functioning of the executive branch through the revelation of the
deliberations of law enforcement personnel or of a grand jury.350 Under the
framework provided above, the answer is quite simple: if the suit would
amount to judicial second-guessing of a policy decision, it should be barred.
But that will rarely be the case for falsification claims for three principal
reasons. First, the policy-laden decision of whether to charge or investigate
will not be at issue.351 Second, the burden discussed in Abbasi relates to
deliberations regarding policy formation, not routine law enforcement
activities.352 And finally, other restraints, such as market factors and
complaint pleading standards, counteract the concern that Bivens claims will
unfairly intrude on the executive branch.
Though falsification claims will inherently require the judiciary to review
law enforcement decisions, these claims ultimately will not implicate policy
considerations reaching the level of a special factor. Admittedly, law
enforcement decisions can be difficult to isolate from the policy priorities
related to law enforcement’s limited resources in certain cases. At first
glance, examining such decisions would impermissibly implicate policy, as
laid out above. But there is an important distinction with respect to
falsification Bivens claims: the second-guessing is primarily directed
towards the validity of a legal standard made by a judicial body, not a policyinformed decision of the executive branch. As the post-Abbasi cases suggest,
lack of probable cause is often the benchmark for relevant suits like malicious
prosecution.353 That determination, whether in the form of a search warrant
or an arrest, is already made by the court. Any intrusion would be less about
executive discretion than about a legal standard already well within the
competence of the courts.354
Further, Abbasi’s concern about the burden of an inquiry into the functions
of the other branches arose from the prospect of dredging up deliberations on
the formation of policy.355 Mere review of executive functions, even if
349. See, e.g., supra notes 146–149, 202–204 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
351. See generally supra Part II (finding that discretionary decisions to start an
investigation were not at issue in any falsification claim examined).
352. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860–61 (2017).
353. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing Karkalas and the diversion investigator’s lack of
familiarity with probable cause as a special factor).
354. The risk that the fact finder is improperly prejudiced by certain discretionary elements
of the officer’s conduct is real but would not be unique to falsification Bivens claims.
355. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
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intrusive, did not pose the separation-of-powers concerns that worried the
Court.356 An examination of high-level policy decisions, on the other hand,
could chill the policy-creating process altogether.357 This reasoning is
consistent with the fact that the quintessential Bivens claim naturally reviews
certain decision-making processes of law enforcement. With this in mind, if
a Bivens claim alleging fabrication of evidence, for example, were aimed at
challenging a policy, the intrusion concern would rise to the level of a special
factor precluding a Bivens claim.358 But the nature of falsification claims
should make this very unlikely. Fabrication of evidence, malicious
prosecution, lying to a grand jury, and the like will all constitute rogue action
outside the scope of agency policy, almost by definition. The Abbassi
Court’s concern about chilling legitimate executive deliberation or conduct
would thus be inapplicable to falsification claims.
Part III.B also catalogued cases where intrusion into the secrecy of the
grand jury or into prosecutorial discretion amounted to a special factor.359
While secrecy of the grand jury is pivotal to ongoing law enforcement
operations, it is also for the benefit of the as yet uncharged, unconvicted, and
unrepresented defendant.360 Grand jury testimony may also be disclosed “in
connection with a judicial proceeding.”361 Admittedly, the possibility of
court-imposed damages could inhibit prosecutorial discretion to a certain
extent. But only to the extent that a prosecutor’s office regularly deliberates
about unethical and unconstitutional conduct—hardly a significant
imposition.
A final argument supporting the proposition that these suits would unduly
intrude on the executive branch is that the sheer volume of the suits would
grind that branch’s normal operations to a halt.362 But other restraints already
exist to combat this. The heightened pleading standard established by the
Supreme Court in Iqbal speaks to this directly;363 Abbasi does not. Abbasi,
therefore, should not provide judicial cover to dismiss a Bivens claim simply
because the facts of an adequately pleaded complaint seem implausible.364

356. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
358. For example, Lanuza discusses the actions of the ICE attorney as being line-level
infractions. See Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). A class action suit,
however, might be different. Ironically, this suggests that a more egregious violation (i.e., a
more widespread one) would be permitted to stand in a way an individual violation would not.
But this conforms with the idea that the politically accountable branches are better suited to
make widespread changes and that such a policy change does not align with the deterrence
rationale of the suit.
359. See supra Part III.B (summarizing the lower courts’ special factors conflicts).
360. See generally Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Secrecy, in 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 106 (4th ed. 2010).
361. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
362. See, e.g., Maria S. v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2019) (pointing to a “tidal
wave of litigation” if a Bivens claim is allowed to proceed), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 81 (2019)
(mem.).
363. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009).
364. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, market forces, in the form of attorneys taking on plaintiffs’ cases,
will aid in preventing frivolous claims.365
b. Congressional (In)Action
Another common special factor among the circuit courts, congressional
inaction, comes directly from Abbasi.366 Those courts that rejected
falsification claims almost always found congressional silence to counsel
hesitation in extending a new Bivens claim.367 But this is a problematic
position for these kinds of claims. Reading meaning into congressional
inaction is difficult enough when the baseline for that inaction is a statute of
Congress’s own making.368 When that baseline is a judicially implied
doctrine, affixing positive meaning is an even trickier—if not altogether
futile—proposition. Accordingly, courts go too far when they view
Congress’s failure to legislate in conjunction with a purported awareness that
the Supreme Court has consistently narrowed Bivens.369 There are just as
many indicators pointing in the other direction: the Bivens doctrine has
existed for nearly fifty years; Congress rejected a proposal to subsume Bivens
into the FTCA when it added the law enforcement proviso in 1974;370 and
Congress ratified Bivens when it amended the FTCA with the Westfall Act
in 1988.371 Regardless of whether these countervailing actions are definitive
proof of Congress’s intent, they caution against reading too much into
congressional inaction in this context.
The Abbasi Court’s analysis of congressional silence also stressed the
“frequent and intense” focus Congress had recently directed on terrorism.372
In contrast, case law for falsification claims presents little evidence that
Congress has given any special attention to this issue.373 While the Eighth

365. The floodgates argument is valid only insofar as it permits frivolous claims to proceed.
Meritorious claims of constitutional violations, if they rise to the volume that would
overwhelm the courts, would, of course, be a systemic problem requiring more attention, not
less.
366. See supra notes 127–28, 291–98 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Parts II.A.1–2 (discussing the Fifth and Eighth Circuits); supra Parts II.C.3–
4 (discussing the Third and Tenth Circuits); supra Parts III.B (explaining how congressional
inaction fits together across the circuits).
368. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67 (1988). Many scholars have cast doubt on its relevance, and some went so far as to
suggest that legislative inaction “is a fortiori a forbidden source of law.” Laurence H. Tribe,
Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional
Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 517 (1982). But see James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary
on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1, 75–94 (1994) (defending the use of legislative inaction as an interpretive tool in certain
circumstances).
369. See supra Part II.A.2 (detailing the Fifth Circuit’s position).
370. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 312, at 131.
371. See Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 44, at 579.
372. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017).
373. See supra Part II.
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Circuit374 and a district court in the Third Circuit375 pointed to the Hyde
Amendment as proof of Congress’s scrutiny of the issue, the Hyde
Amendment was simply a last-minute rider to a large appropriations bill for
several large executive departments and the judiciary.376 Moreover, it
provided for damages from the government. This lies in stark contrast to the
theme of individual accountability, and the resulting deterrence, that has
always been at the heart of Bivens.377 To suggest that this small provision
for attorney’s fees in the middle of a massive appropriations bill was intended
to preempt Bivens for falsification claims also reads too much into
congressional inaction.
Consequently, the current landscape of
congressional activity (and inactivity) is best understood not to constitute a
special factor for falsification claims.
c. Unique Law Enforcement Operations
A final special factor that often arose in Part II’s examination was the
nature of the law enforcement action.378 In these cases, the fact-specific
examination turned up some unique characteristic of the investigation or
prosecution that counseled hesitation. For one court, it was the pursuit of a
transnational organized crime group;379 for another, the defendant was not a
typical officer but a diversion investigator.380 Having clarified the Abbasi
focus on separation of powers,381 the task again turns to the question of
whether these unique circumstances second-guess the policy decisions of the
other branches. And, again, the nature of these Bivens claims should require
an answer in the negative. The common fact patterns for these cases—lying
to a grand jury, fabricating evidence, manipulating witnesses—will not
concern discretionary decisions. Although a claim of retaliatory prosecution
might implicate such a policy decision, falsification claims turn on conduct
that clearly lacks the imprimatur of an agency’s policy decision.
C. Aligning Alternative Remedies with Abbasi
Beyond the conflicting perspectives on special factors, there is a unique
tension within falsification claims due to the fact that some, such as malicious
prosecution, are expressly permitted under the FTCA.382 As a result, the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the existence of an alternative remedial
structure might displace a Bivens remedy altogether383 butts directly against
Congress’s clear intention to provide redress for certain law enforcement
374. See supra Part II.A.1.
375. See supra Part II.C.3.
376. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
377. See supra Part I.C (discussing the deterrence rationale made explicit in Carlson).
378. See supra Part III.B (noting the use of specific circumstances of the investigation as a
special factor by various courts).
379. See supra notes 169–69 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part IV.B.1.
382. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
383. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1865 (2017).
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abuses.384 The most obvious conflict is thus whether the FTCA should bar
these falsification Bivens claims, as the Fifth Circuit held.385 Despite the fact
that there might be overlap, the Supreme Court has been clear that Congress
intended Bivens and FTCA actions to complement—not replace—one
another.386 But even if that issue is readily resolved, the underlying tension
surfaces in another way. The lower courts disagree on whether an alternative
remedy must provide meaningful relief to bar a Bivens suit or if its mere
existence suffices, even if relief is effectively unavailable to the plaintiff.
A modified approach to this conflict, eschewing both rigid formalism and
a functional test that always mandates qualitative relief, would align most
closely with Abbasi. There, the habeas petition and injunction the Court
viewed as alternative remedies were hardly meaningful in light of the
communication blackout imposed on the plaintiffs during their
confinement.387 But even if ineffective under the circumstances, those
remedies at least had the potential to vindicate the wrongful imprisonment
and the constitutional interests at stake. The suggestion by some courts that
the Hyde Amendment, various wrongful conviction statutes, or the Ryan
Haight Act388 constitute alternative remedies is too formalistic. The potential
for reasonable attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, sought at the
conclusion of a criminal trial, hardly resembles a civil damages action.
Moreover, the law enforcement misconduct at issue in a Bivens claim
frequently occurs well before trial, and many criminal-defendants-turnedBivens-plaintiffs had their charges dropped before formal prosecution, not at
the conclusion of a criminal trial.389 The original Bivens case makes clear
that a wrongful arrest or unlawful privacy invasion, without developing into
prosecution, requires the potential counterweight of a damages remedy.390
Further, the wrongful conviction statute would not have provided relief in a
single post-Abbasi case examined in this Note, and the Ryan Haight Act was
quite clearly designed to regulate the pharmaceutical industry, not to protect
constitutional rights.391 These proposed remedies will therefore rarely have
the potential to remedy the wrong, as at least a habeas petition or injunction
could have in Abbasi.
Courts should instead look to whether the proposed alternative remedial
structure has the potential to address the underlying constitutional violation,
at least at an abstract level, if not under the precise circumstances of the case.
To be sure, the plaintiff is not entitled to the guarantee that the alternative
remedy will provide meaningful and specific relief. But the remedial
384. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
385. See supra Part III.C (discussing how, of the cases examined, only the Fifth Circuit in
Cantú suggested that an FTCA claim would preclude a Bivens claim arising from the same
facts).
386. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (detailing the legislative history of the 1974
amendment to the FTCA).
387. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 249–49 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.C.1.
390. See supra Part I.B.
391. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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structure must at least speak to a constitutional violation, on the one hand,
and permit the possibility for individual deterrence on the other. If it does,
the court should find that it prevents the extension of the Bivens suit to the
new context. The purpose of the legislation would be an important
consideration in this analysis—whether the unconstitutional conduct alleged
in the Bivens suit was clearly the kind of harm sought to be remedied by the
legislation. For example, the Privacy Act of 1974,392 which provides a
private action for compensatory damages for illegal surveillance, would
speak to certain Fourth Amendment claims.393 The possibility of punitive
damages might be another factor worth considering in light of the individual
deterrence rationale. While this proposal would not create a bright-line rule
for falsification claims, it would give clearer guidance on the issue while
remaining true to Abbasi. It also leaves open the possibility that future
criminal justice reform legislation might constitute an alternative remedial
structure for these kinds of Bivens claims, even if proposed and passed
outside the Bivens context.
D. Coda: Well Suited to the Bivens Task
Though the three preceding sections addressed what Abbasi viewed as
essential components of a new Bivens suit, there was more to the Court’s
guidance. It introduced these elements with a more overarching question: is
the judiciary “well suited” to determine if a Bivens claim should exist?394 In
falsification claims, however, a meritorious claim means that there will be
another victim besides the plaintiff: the courts. That is, in contrast to most
other Bivens suits, the alleged misconduct will also be an affront to the
integrity of the judiciary. When an officer fabricates evidence or a prosecutor
misrepresents facts to a grand jury or a magistrate judge, the result, in part,
is damage to the confidence and effectiveness of the court system.
Consequently, as long as the separation-of-powers concerns are satisfied—
which they will be if the court is not asked to second-guess the policy of the
political branches—a court will more often than not be well suited to
determine whether extending a Bivens claim is warranted. Unlike other
Bivens cases, the unique consequences of this kind of Bivens claim on the
judicial process itself provide a special guarantee of competency when the
courts make this judgment.
CONCLUSION
Since Abbasi, the viability of a Bivens suit for monetary damages in claims
alleging fabrication of evidence or other intentional misrepresentation by
federal law enforcement officials is unsettled and inconsistent. The
availability of a damages remedy has long depended on whether the

392. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018).
393. See id. § 552a(g); Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 624 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a
Bivens claim for unlawful electronic surveillance).
394. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858 (2017).
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misconduct was perpetrated by a state or federal officer. But in falsification
claims after Abassi, that availability also depends on the federal judicial
district or circuit in which the misconduct occurred. Moreover, the diversity
of results and approaches makes reliance by citizens or officers nearly
impossible. This Note seeks to alleviate this problem by providing further
clarification of the determining factors for these kinds of Bivens claims while
remaining within the boundaries of Abbasi. This Note proposes an
understanding of separation of powers that focuses on the courts’ refraining
from second-guessing executive or legislative policy judgments and goes
hand in hand with the traditional deterrence rationale in Bivens suits. It
ultimately leads to a solution that places Abbasi more in line with Bivens than
is commonly thought.
ADDENDUM
As this Note was going to press, the Supreme Court decided Hernández v.
Mesa,395 a Bivens case concerning a U.S. Customs and Border Protection
agent who shot and killed a fifteen-year-old Mexican national standing on
the other side of the border.396 Justice Samuel Alito, writing for a 5-4
majority, affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to dismiss the claim, finding
that the foreign relations and national security issues at stake constituted
special factors under the Abbasi framework.397 At first glance, the Court’s
rejection of a suit arising from such unique circumstances—a cross-border,
international incident—seems to add little to the modern Bivens doctrine.
Yet Hernández adds three pertinent points, each of which supports this
Note’s findings and conclusions.
First, as a preliminary matter, Hernández confirms this Note’s analytical
framework for falsification claims. Perhaps it is unsurprising that the Court
followed the precedent it had established just three years ago; still, Abbasi
and its “two-step inquiry” remains the primary source of instruction for lower
courts in Bivens cases.398 Accordingly, this Note’s examination of the lower
courts’ treatment of falsification claims appropriately follows Abbasi as its
lodestar, as confirmed by Hernández.
Second, and more importantly, Hernández underscores Abbasi’s
separation-of-powers focus while highlighting the vast difference between
cases like Hernández and Abbasi, on the one hand, and the falsification
claims examined in this Note, on the other. The Court held that the special
factors in Hernández—the foreign policy and national security implications
of the cross-border shooting—could ultimately “be condensed to one
concern—respect for the separation of powers.”399 In addition to
reemphasizing separation of powers, however, the Hernández special factors
also make clear the kind of executive branch action that the Court considers
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

No. 17-1678 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2020).
See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text.
Hernández, slip op. at 1, 9–12.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 19.
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to be beyond the judiciary’s purview via Bivens. Foreign policy and border
security issues are “delicate, complex” matters of executive policy in areas
where the executive branch has historically had vast discretion.400
Falsification claims directed at rank-and-file federal law enforcement
officers, by contrast, are mostly of a different order. Consequently,
Hernández further supports this Note’s principal conclusion that, where
falsification claims do not ask the judiciary to second-guess the political
branches’ policy decisions, they should generally be permitted to proceed.
Finally, the Hernández Court rejected Justice Clarence Thomas’s plea to
“abandon the doctrine altogether.”401 It thus retained the possibility of new
Bivens suits, at least insofar as they conform to the (admittedly narrow)
Abbasi framework. This was not necessarily a given; five members of the
current Court took no part in the Abbasi decision in 2017402 and the Court’s
ideological center has almost certainly shifted since Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s retirement and Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment. Yet
Justice Thomas’s concurrence, in which he argued that it was “time to correct
this Court’s error” by eliminating the Bivens suit, garnered only Justice Neil
Gorsuch’s support.403 Justice Thomas was unable to build on the two-justice
opposition he had assembled nearly thirteen years ago in Wilkie;404 seven
members of the Court remain committed to Bivens. Understood in this
context, the Hernández decision leaves no doubt as to the strength of the stare
decisis interest in Bivens suits. As Abbasi made clear, that interest is
strongest in the “recurrent sphere of law enforcement,” like falsification
claims.405 In sum, Hernández supports this Note’s view that the
unacknowledged split with respect to falsification claims can be resolved by
asking whether the suit will require judicial second-guessing of the political
branches’ policy discretion. Given the inherent nature of the falsification
claims surveyed here, this Note concludes they will not and in most cases
should be permitted to proceed.

400. Id. (quoting Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1414 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring)).
401. Id. at 5 (Thomas, J., concurring).
402. See supra note 114.
403. Hernández, slip op. at 5 (Thomas, J., concurring).
404. See supra note 345.
405. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).

